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SHAREHOLDER EUGENICS IN THE
PUBLIC CORPORATION
Edward B. Rock†
In a world of active, empowered shareholders, the match between share-
holders and public corporations potentially affects firm value.  This Article
examines the extent to which publicly held corporations can shape their share-
holder base.  Two sorts of approaches are available: “direct” or “recruitment”
strategies and “shaping” or “socialization” strategies.  Direct or recruitment
strategies, which attract “good” shareholders to the firm, include going pub-
lic, targeted placement of shares, traditional investor relations, the exploita-
tion of clientele effects, and “de-recruitment.”  Shaping or socialization
strategies, which transform shareholders of a “bad” or unknown type into
shareholders of the “good” type, include choice of domicile, choice of stock
exchange, the new “strategic” investor relations, and capital structure.  For
each type of strategy, I consider the extent to which corporate and securities
law facilitates or interferes with the strategy as well as the ways in which it
controls abuse.  In examining the relationship between shareholder base and
firms, this Article attempts to merge investor relations, very broadly con-
strued, with corporate governance.
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INTRODUCTION
A private corporation chooses its shareholders.  New participants
can be recruited or shunned.  When a firm goes public, it relinquishes
much of this freedom.  As Warren Buffett put it: “Mrs. Astor could
select her 400, but anyone can buy any stock.  Entering members of a
shareholder ‘club’ cannot be screened for intellectual capacity, emo-
tional stability, moral sensitivity or acceptable dress.  Shareholder
eugenics, therefore, might appear to be a hopeless undertaking.”1
Is “shareholder eugenics,” in fact, a hopeless undertaking?  Are
there tools for screening entering members for capacity, stability, sen-
sitivity, or dress?  To what extent does the law facilitate shareholder
eugenics?  To what extent does it interfere?  When it interferes, does it
do so unnecessarily?
1 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to
Shareholders (Mar. 14, 1984), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/
1983.html.
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Many of the reasons for choosing good co-investors in the private
firm (and for avoiding bad ones) carry over into the publicly held
firm.  We know from venture capital that sophisticated investors may
be able to contribute managerial skill, relationships with customers
and suppliers, contacts with investment bankers, and sage counsel to a
start-up business.2  Likewise, we know from private equity experience
that sophisticated investors may be particularly skilled at several differ-
ent but important functions: reorienting a mature business that has
lost its focus while public, including undoing excessive diversification;
providing high-powered incentives to managers combined with high-
powered monitoring; and providing patient capital during a period of
unsettled market conditions.3  Similarly, in the public corporation
context, there are reasons to believe that the right match between in-
vestors and firms can be important to firm value.  Is shareholder
eugenics as hopeless an undertaking as it might first appear?
There are, in fact, a wide variety of modes of shareholder eugen-
ics.  At the same time, there are clear limits to a firm’s ability to craft
its shareholder base.  Once one seriously entertains the notion that
the composition of a firm’s shareholder base can impact a firm’s suc-
cess, the methods for shaping that base—for good or for ill—become
a salient dimension of corporate governance, a dimension that has
been largely ignored.  Put differently, investor relations, broadly con-
strued, begins to converge with corporate governance.
From the perspective of financial economics, this Article focuses
on the relationship between the shareholder base and firm value.
Two seminal contributions are the models developed by Amihud and
Mendelson4 and Merton.5  Both start from the intuition, nicely stated
by Merton, that the “portfolios held by actual investors (both individ-
ual and institutional) contain only a small fraction of the thousands of
traded securities available” and then draw a link between the share-
holders of a company and its cost of capital.6
The Merton model starts from the observation that shareholders
will only choose among known stocks—the “investor recognition hy-
2 See generally PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 127–54,
157–70 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the structure of venture capital investing and the impor-
tance of the private equity organizational form); ANDREW METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VEN-
TURE CAPITAL & THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION 9–14, 94–183 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing the
history and development of the venture capital industry and examining how top-tier ven-
ture capitalists add value through investing, monitoring, and exiting).
3 See JOSH LERNER, FELDA HARDYMON & ANN LEAMON, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE
EQUITY: A CASEBOOK 72–111 (4th ed. 2009).
4 Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid–Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN.
ECON. 223, 223–47 (1986).
5 Robert C. Merton, A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Infor-
mation, 42 J. FIN. 483, 487–508 (1987).
6 Id. at 488, 499–504; see Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 4, at 223–24, 246–47. R
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pothesis,” an assumption of incomplete information.7  This limits a
firm’s ability to raise capital.8  Merton’s model introduced the useful
concept of “set-up” costs:
If an investor does not follow a particular firm, then an earnings or
other specific announcement about that firm is not likely to cause
that investor to take a position in the firm.  If, for each firm, inves-
tors must pay a significant “set-up” (or “receiver”) cost before they
can process detailed information released from time to time about
the firm, then this fixed cost will cause any one investor to follow
only a subset of the traded securities.  Because this fixed cost is a
“sunk cost” for existing shareholders, the effective information re-
ceived by current shareholders, even from a public announcement
by the firm, will not be the same as that received by other investors.9
Merton shows that, especially for small firms, these set-up costs can
raise the cost of capital and reduce the value of the firm.10
By contrast, Amihud and Mendelson developed a model in which
liquidity generates a clientele effect: short-term investors prefer stocks
with a small bid–ask spread, while longer-term shareholders gravitate
towards larger-spread assets.11  Because longer-term shareholders get
paid for giving up liquidity in the form of higher expected returns,
there is a connection between liquidity and the cost of capital.  Thus,
as in the Merton model, the shareholder base and cost of capital are
correlated.12
Although these models draw different (but potentially comple-
mentary) connections between the identity of the shareholders—the
shareholder base—and the firm’s cost of capital, the key foundational
insight of both is that there is such a connection.  The models have
generated a large literature, which this Article will address as it be-
comes relevant.13  As will become clear, these models are important
for understanding the extent to which companies can tailor their
shareholder base and the means for doing so.  An immediate implica-
tion of both models is that firms have an incentive to invest in ex-
panding their shareholder base.  Indeed, the process of attracting
investors who do not currently own shares may be similar to market-
ing the firm’s products.14  Buffett’s question about shareholder
eugenics involves both (a) the link between shareholder base and firm
7 See Merton, supra note 5, at 488, 494–95. R
8 See id. at 484–87.
9 Id. at 489–90 (internal footnote omitted).
10 See id. at 484–85, 502.
11 See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 4, at 246. R
12 See id. at 224, 246.
13 See infra Part II.D.3.
14 See Merton, supra note 5, at 501. R
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value, and (b) the extent to which a firm can influence its shareholder
base.
We live in an era of empowered shareholders.  Shareholding is
more concentrated than ever before.15  Shareholders vote on more
things than they ever have, with proposals to give them even more
power.16  Activist shareholders and intermediaries of various stripes
have emerged and have had a significant impact.17  Although contro-
versy continues over whether empowering shareholders is good or
bad,18 different and more interesting questions arise from an acknowl-
edgement that shareholders are empowered.  That new reality re-
quires rethinking the relationship between shareholders and the firm.
Learning how to interact productively has never been more important
to shareholders or firms.  From a regulatory perspective, we need to
reconsider some current limitations that treat shareholders like
children.
This Article is an investigation into the tools available for recruit-
ing and shaping the shareholder base.  Part I briefly explores the goals
of crafting a shareholder base in a public corporation.  Part II turns to
the available tools for directly shaping that base, what I refer to as
“direct” or “recruitment” strategies: the tools for identifying “good”
shareholders and bringing them into the firm (and the related “de-
recruitment” strategies of discouraging or ousting bad shareholders).
They include going public, targeted placement of shares, traditional
investor relations or communications strategies, the exploitation of
clientele effects, and de-recruitment.  Part III examines what I refer to
as “shaping” or “socialization” strategies, which transform sharehold-
ers of a “bad” or unknown type into shareholders of the “good” type.
In contrast to the direct or recruitment strategies, shaping or socializa-
tion strategies largely shape the shareholder base by modifying the
shareholder role.  They include choice of domicile, choice of stock
exchange, “strategic” investor relations, and capital structure.  For
each type of strategy, I consider the ways that corporate and securities
15 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 995–98 (2010).
16 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 836 (2005).
17 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corpo-
rate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1029 (2007).
18 Compare Bebchuk, supra note 16, at 836 (“Increasing shareholder power to inter- R
vene . . . would improve corporate governance and enhance shareholder value . . . .”), with
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 653, 659 (2010) (arguing against shareholder empowerment and in favor of the
“prevailing legal structure”), and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1750 (2006) (rejecting Bebchuk’s argument and
responding that “shareholder voting is properly understood not as a primary component
of the corporate decisionmaking structure, but rather as an accountability device of last
resort, to be used sparingly, at most”).
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law facilitates or undermines the strategy, as well as the ways in which
it controls abuse.  I close with a brief conclusion.
I
GOALS IN CRAFTING THE SHAREHOLDER BASE IN
THE PUBLIC CORPORATION
What are firms looking for in shareholders?  In short, they are
looking for good shareholders and hoping to avoid bad ones.
A. What is a Good Shareholder?
What makes a shareholder a good shareholder?  First and fore-
most, shareholders provide money.  In particular, firms look for
money that is committed to the firm forever and that is available at an
attractive price.  Thus, in going public, both Blackstone and KKR, the
pioneers of private equity, acknowledged the comparative advantage
of the public company form in raising long-term committed capital
that permits long-term investments.  As Blackstone stated in its S-1:
We have decided to become a public company:
• to access new sources of permanent capital that we can use to
invest in our existing businesses, to expand into complemen-
tary new businesses and to further strengthen our develop-
ment as an enduring institution;
• to enhance our firm’s valuable brand;
• to provide us with a publicly-traded equity currency and to
enhance our flexibility in pursuing future strategic
acquisitions;
• to expand the range of financial and retention incentives
that we can provide to our existing and future employees
through the issuance of equity-related securities representing
an interest in the value and performance of our firm as a
whole; and
• to permit the realization over time of the value of our equity
held by our existing owners.19
Similarly, KKR described the advantage of listing on the NYSE as pro-
viding “a significant source of permanent capital to further grow our
business and an equity currency that we may use to attract, retain and
incentivize our employees and to fund opportunistic acquisitions.”20
But the relationship with shareholders is a long-term relation-
ship.  In addition to providing money, shareholders create the secon-
dary market for shares.  A well-functioning market for shares allows
existing shareholders to exit at a price that is a reasonable estimate of
19 Blackstone Grp. L.P., Securities Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 7 (Mar. 22,
2007).
20 KKR & Co. L.P., Securities Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 1 (Sept. 16, 2010).
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the value of the investment in the firm and likewise allows new share-
holders to enter at a reasonable price.  Moreover, a secondary trading
market with reasonably accurate prices means that shares can be used
to make acquisitions without dilution of the buying firm’s sharehold-
ers  (in the case of undervalued shares) or dilution of the selling
firm’s shareholders (in the case of overvalued shares).21  Similarly, a
reasonably accurate stock price makes stock- or option-based compen-
sation a more useful tool for aligning manager and shareholder inter-
ests.  Therefore, one definition of a “good shareholder base” is a
shareholder base that produces a stock price that reasonably approxi-
mates firm value.  In this context, a good shareholder is one who eval-
uates firms according to long-term fundamental value rather than
short-run earnings.22
Beyond these two fairly uncontroversial propositions, one may
also understand a good shareholder to be one who increases firm
value.  Here, controversy abounds over who counts as a good share-
holder.  One person’s “active monitor” is another person’s “intrusive
busybody” or “speculator.”  A shareholder who is good from a share-
holder’s perspective may be bad from a manager’s perspective.  In
what follows, I largely bracket the question of what sorts of share-
holder activities increase or decrease firm value and focus instead on
mechanisms for shaping the shareholder base.  But, before doing so,
it is worth considering some of the ways in which shareholders can
potentially add value.
Shareholders may bring specific skills or expertise to a firm.  For
example, they may bring “monitoring” expertise.23  These skills can
vary and may be more valuable to some firms than to others.  When
Warren Buffett invested in Goldman Sachs during the darkest days of
the financial crisis, it was viewed as a huge vote of confidence in
Goldman Sachs’ soundness.24
Using Hirschman’s typology, monitoring expertise can impact
governance through the exercise of “voice” or “exit.”25  Voice, in this
21 See Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung & Antyom Durnev, Law, Share
Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 333–57
(2003).
22 See Alex Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia, 64 J.
FIN. 2481, 2482, 2486–87 (2009).
23 Id. at 2482.
24 Ben White, Buffett Deal at Goldman Seen as a Sign of Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2008, at A1, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/business/24goldman.html.
25 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DE-
CLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 1–54 (1970) (detailing the role of shareholder
voice); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activ-
ism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 451–63 (1991) (crediting Hirschman for the “the fundamental in-
sights into the shifting dynamics of institutional structure and the vocabulary for thinking
about institutions”).
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context, includes all the modes of shareholder activism from informal
discussions with management to full-fledged proxy fights.  Exit and
the threat of exit impact governance largely through the effect (or
threatened effect) on stock price.  In some models, one may under-
stand a good shareholder as one who, through self-interested deci-
sions to sell or not sell, renders the firm’s strategies and disclosures
more credible and incentivizes managers to increase firm value.26  But
the goodness of shareholders can also be more diffuse and aggrega-
tive; one may view the stock price, which emerges from the interaction
of buying and selling shareholders, as a running commentary on man-
agerial performance.  For both voice and exit, the size of a share-
holder’s block may be critical in providing incentives to invest in
monitoring and in limiting a shareholder’s ability to exit.27
Shareholder monitoring—and thus shareholders with particular
monitoring skills—may be more or less valuable depending on the
volatility of the returns, the nature of the assets, the presence of other
constituencies (e.g., institutional lenders or government regulators)
who provide some monitoring, and a host of other factors.28  In addi-
tion, shareholders may increase firm value through their ability to
help the firm with management or marketing, either through experi-
ence with similar companies or through industry contacts.29  In yet
another variant, shareholders—or shareholdings—may be “hostages”
that support bilateral exchange.30  For example, in a joint venture,
cross-shareholdings may be part of the glue that holds the relationship
together and facilitates investment in relationship-specific assets.31
As I discuss below, the contestability of control that accompanies
going public creates obvious dangers of its own.  Outside parties may
threaten disruption as a way of extracting payments.  If the market
price undervalues the firm, buyers may try to buy the firm on the
cheap.  Shareholders with conflicting interests may support plans that
benefit other firms.  A good shareholder is one who will protect a cor-
poration from these dangers.
26 See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism:
Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645, 2646, 2649 (2009); Edmans, supra note 22, at R
248; Alex Edmans & Gustavo Manso, Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory
of Multiple Blockholders, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2395, 2396 (2011). See generally Sreedhar T.
Bharath, Sudarshan Jayaraman & Venky Nagar, Exit as Governance: An Empirical Analysis
7–27 (July 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572940
(demonstrating a robust relation between exogenous increase or decrease in liquidity,
block ownership, and managerial sensitivity to stock price and firm value).
27 See Edmans & Manso, supra note 26, at 2398–99, 2404. R
28 Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms,
93 VA. L. REV. 515, 552–57 (2007).
29 Cf. id. at 551–52 (noting that shareholders may have incentives to monitor
management).
30 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 121 (1996).
31 See id. at 124–37.
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B. What is a Bad Shareholder?
Bad shareholders are the inverse of good shareholders.  An exam-
ple of this type of shareholder is one who, through their manic-de-
pressive personalities or attitudes or by intentional actions, causes the
stock price to depart from a reasonable estimate of long-term funda-
mental value.  This can hurt the firm by increasing its cost of capital or
by interfering with the positive contribution that can be made by a
steady, accurate stock price.32
A different type of bad shareholder is one who seeks to gain at
the expense of other shareholders by extracting non–pro rata pay-
ments (e.g., targeted share repurchases or “greenmail”) or by benefit-
ing a different firm.  Another variety of bad shareholder is one who
pursues short-term gain at the expense of long-term value.  This could
mean triggering a change of control at an inopportune time or pres-
suring a firm to pay dividends beyond the free cash flow.  Additionally,
a bad shareholder can be one who brings bad publicity on the firm for
personal gain (e.g., a shareholder who is net short and seeks gain by
convincing the market that the stock price is overvalued, when it is
not).33  Finally, a bad shareholder may be an excessively litigious
shareholder who, to collect fees, brings litigation that injures the
shareholders as a group.34
The line between a good and a bad shareholder may be a fine
one, as it depends on the interpretation of the shareholder’s conduct.
In addition, different firms are likely to need different sorts of share-
holders, and a shareholder who injures one type of firm may aid an-
other, and vice versa.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to take a position on what
proportion of shareholders are good or bad, or on whether any partic-
ular shareholder or shareholder action hurts or helps any particular
firm.  Because my focus is primarily on the mechanisms of share-
holder eugenics, I assume that shareholders of both types exist, but I
remain agnostic on their identities and the proportions of the two
types.  Moreover, one cannot assume that the shareholder type is an
inherent or intrinsic characteristic.  Indeed, in general, shareholder
type is likely to be significantly a function of incentives.  This mallea-
bility is what makes shareholder eugenics possible.
32 See, e.g., Letter from Warren E. Buffett, supra note 1. R
33 For example, Overstock.com claims to have been the victim of such a “bear raid.”
See Press Release, Overstock.com, Rocker Pays $5 Million to Overstock.com to Settle Law-
suit (Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://investors.overstock.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=131091&
p=irol-newsArticle_pf&ID=1363917&highlight=.
34 See generally Bratton & Wachter, supra note 18, at 655–726 (discussing problems R
with shareholder control).
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C. The Potential Benefits of an Optimal Shareholder Base: A
Simple Illustration
Suppose that a firm has a choice between two investments.  Pro-
ject A has an expected value of ten and is easy to understand and
communicate to the market.  Project B has an expected value of fif-
teen but is complex and hard to explain, and thus the value is unlikely
to be reflected in stock price until the project has come to fruition.
Suppose further that shareholders come in two types: impatient and
patient.  Finally, suppose that shareholders collectively have enough
power, one way or another, to influence the managers’ choice of
projects.35
If firms cannot effectively shape their shareholder base and end
up with impatient shareholders, managers are likely to “manage to the
market”36 and choose project A: responsive to their impatient share-
holders, they choose the lower value project that will be reflected in
the stock price and leave the extra five on the table because of the
unbridgeable asymmetry of information.  On the other hand, if firms
can craft a shareholder base of patient shareholders, who are willing
to trust managers and wait for hard-to-value projects to come to frui-
tion, then managers will be free to choose project B with its higher
returns.37  Indeed, even if shaping the shareholder base is costly, it
would make sense to spend up to five in doing so to capture the
higher returns from project B.38
D. The Dangers of Picking Your Shareholders
The ability to choose shareholders can be abused.  Indeed, nearly
every structure and strategy of shareholder eugenics discussed below
can benefit managers or controlling shareholders at the expense of
noncontrolling shareholders.  As I will show, the law makes many of
these strategies possible.  It also addresses, albeit incompletely and im-
perfectly, the dark side of shareholder eugenics.
The problem, of course, is that certain sorts of shareholders may
be good for managers or controlling shareholders but bad for share-
35 This is a variation of a hypothetical by William Bratton and Michael Wachter. See
id. at 700–03.
36 Id. at 690.
37 For some evidence of a link between stock liquidity (and thus the proportion of
short versus long-term shareholders) and investment choice, see Vivian W. Fang, Xuan
Tian & Sheri Tice, Does Stock Liquidity Enhance or Impede Firm Innovation? 3, 11–14
(Jan. 23, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1746399.
38 As this example shows, the link between shareholder base and firm value is entirely
consistent with common views of the informational efficiency of markets. See, e.g., Edmans,
supra note 22, at 2504–05 (arguing that shareholders who hold small blocks of shares can R
have a significant impact on the firm’s value by “gathering and trading on intangible
information”).
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holders overall, or vice versa.  To the extent managers or controlling
shareholders have discretion to shape the shareholder base to in-
crease firm value, they can use that discretion to benefit managers or
controlling shareholders at the expense of firm value.
The dark side of manager and controlling-shareholder discretion
is a pervasive issue in corporate law.  Indeed, many features of corpo-
rate law—from independent directors and shareholder voting to man-
agement compensation and shareholder litigation—are at least
partially responses to these agency problems.  I will not rehash these
general arguments.  Rather, with regard to each of the structures or
strategies of shareholder eugenics discussed below, I will identify the
distinctive agency costs that can emerge and any specific legal
responses.
II
TOOLS FOR CRAFTING THE SHAREHOLDER BASE:  “DIRECT”
OR “RECRUITMENT” STRATEGIES
As noted earlier, there are numerous means for recruiting share-
holders of a desired type, at least in part.  In this Part, I examine some
of them.
A. Going Public
In the first instance, going public itself is a fundamental choice
about shareholder base.  In going public, the company is embarking
on a process in which the existing shareholders (employees, venture
capitalists, private equity investors, or other private investors) are re-
placed with shareholders of a very different sort.  Institutions like mu-
tual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and charitable
endowments rarely invest directly in privately held companies but do
in public companies.  Similarly, most individual investors do not and
cannot invest in private companies but often are quite keen to invest
in newly public companies.
As a result, the initial public offering (IPO) will often mark the
beginning of the end of the relationship with sophisticated investors
who played a prominent role in the company during its period as a
private company.  When a venture capital-financed start-up company
goes public, the venture capital funds are often expected to exit in a
secondary offering shortly thereafter.39  Likewise, when a company
taken private by a private equity fund reemerges as a public company,
the private equity fund will begin to cash out its position either in the
IPO itself or shortly thereafter in a secondary offering.  In each case,
39 Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Mar-
kets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 257–58 (1998).
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the investor’s comparative advantage is in developing or restructuring
companies while private.  Once the company goes public, these spe-
cialized investors desire to redeploy their capital to other engage-
ments where their ability to profit is greater.40
Further, once a firm goes public, its relationship with its share-
holders is transformed.  While a private firm is free to share informa-
tion with shareholders without revealing it to the world (and
competitors), doing so is much harder for public companies.  Moreo-
ver, a private company can be selective in revealing information to
shareholders to a much greater degree than a public company can.
Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) limits (although does not eliminate)
a public firm’s ability to make such selective disclosures.41
1. Underwriter Share Placement in IPOs and Secondary Offerings
The process of going public provides an opportunity for choosing
a shareholder base.  Whether in a firm-commitment or best-efforts un-
derwriting, the underwriter’s key role is to place the shares of the is-
suer with investors.  Underwriters play this role both in IPOs as well as
in subsequent offerings.  The IPO is of particular interest because it is
when the issuer is first introduced to the capital markets, its share-
holder base is first created, and the share price in the secondary mar-
ket creates the baseline for subsequent offerings.42
The IPO process and the persistent phenomenon of “underpric-
ing” have attracted much theoretical and empirical interest.43  One of
the key stylized facts that has emerged from the literature is that un-
derwriters typically do not sell the shares by open auction but rather
allocate them.  In particular, it is generally believed that underwriters
seek to place the shares with “long-term investors” who have a track
record with the underwriter.44  When Goldman Sachs went public, for
example, it placed shares “with a group of institutional investors and
rich individuals who Goldman believed would remain loyal, long-term
holders and not ‘flip’ the stock after its opening.”45  This general view
40 Id. at 252–58.
41 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–03 (2011).
42 See Fox et al., supra note 21, at 345. R
43 For a brief review, see Lawrence M. Benveniste & Paul A. Spindt, How Investment
Bankers Determine the Offer Price and Allocation of New Issues, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 343, 344–46
(1989); Tim Jenkinson & Howard Jones, IPO Pricing and Allocation: A Survey of the Views of
Institutional Investors, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1477, 1478–79 (2009).
44 See Tim Jenkinson & Howard Jones, Bids and Allocations in European IPO Bookbuild-
ing, 59 J. FIN. 2309, 2328–31 (2004).
45 Charles Gasparino, Goldman IPO Lives up to Expectations, Posts 33% Gain in First
Trading Day, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1999, at C19.
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is supported by survey evidence46 as well as an examination of under-
writers’ books.47
Share placement provides one of many explanations for IPO un-
derpricing.48  From the investors’ perspective, a commitment to hold
for the long term creates a risk for which they need to be compen-
sated.  From the issuers’ and underwriters’ perspectives, underpricing
both compensates the investors for this increased risk and bonds the
investors’ commitments to hold for the long term.49
The terms of investors’ implicit commitment to hold remain
somewhat unclear.  On the one hand, it is a commitment not to sell
(much) in the early days following the IPO.  Overall, investors only
sell around 15% of their allotment during the first days after an IPO.50
The reselling of these shares, combined with short selling and market-
making activity, results in a relatively high trading volume.51  Interest-
ingly, flipping is less common in “cold” than “hot” IPOs: in cold IPOs,
institutional investors sell on average about 20% of their allocations,
while in hot IPOs they sell close to 47% of their allocation.52  Under
the typical underwriting agreement, when investors flip shares the
managing underwriter can reclaim fees earned by broker-dealers
through the imposition of a “penalty bid.”53  The Depository Trust
Company’s IPO Tracking System allows underwriters to monitor flip-
46 See Jenkinson & Jones, supra note 43, at 1495–96, 1496 fig.4. R
47 See Jenkinson & Jones, supra note 44.  High quality investors are defined as “inves- R
tors who are likely to be long-term holders of the [s]hares.” Id. at 2316 (quoting the defini-
tion of investor quality from the “Rules of Engagement” given to members of underwriting
syndicates).
48 A partially competing, partially complementary theory is bookbuilding—a mecha-
nism by which informed investors reveal their valuation through a price limit on their
order and are compensated through underpricing. See Lawrence M. Benveniste & William
J. Wilhelm, A Comparative Analysis of IPO Proceeds Under Alternative Regulatory Environments,
28 J. FIN. ECON. 173, 193–95 (1990); Francesca Cornelli & David Goldreich, Bookbuilding
and Strategic Allocation, 56 J. FIN. 2337, 2337 (2001); Francesca Cornelli & David Goldreich,
Bookbuilding: How Informative Is the Order Book?, 58 J. FIN. 1415, 1415–17 (2003); Alexander
P. Ljungqvist & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., IPO Allocations: Discriminatory or Discretionary?, 65 J.
FIN. ECON. 167, 169 (2002); Ann E. Sherman & Sheridan Titman, Building the IPO Order
Book: Underpricing and Participation Limits with Costly Information, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3–6
(2002).  If this is the dominant effect, then bookbuilding is not so much about crafting a
reliable shareholder base but simply part of the underwriting process itself. See Cornelli &
Goldreich, Bookbuilding and Strategic Allocation, supra, at 2337–39.
49 See Jenkinson & Jones, supra note 44, at 2332–34. R
50 See Reena Aggarwal, Allocation of Initial Public Offerings and Flipping Activity, 68 J. FIN.
ECON. 111, 118 (2003).
51 See id. at 132–33.
52 Id. at 113.
53 See Trading Practices Rules Concerning Securities Offerings, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,108,
17,124–25 (Apr. 18, 1996); Review of Antimanipulation Regulation of Securities Offerings,
59 Fed. Reg. 21,681, 21,689–90 (Apr. 26, 1994).
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ping, either for the purpose of imposing penalty bids or for future
allocation.54
Given these data, one can view the commitment not to flip dur-
ing the stabilization period as fundamentally a commitment by buyers
not to undermine the public offering to the detriment of the under-
writer.  In the case of cold IPOs, the underwriter will end up buying
back the flipped shares, so flipping is particularly problematic.55  In
hot IPOs, flipping is less of a problem.  First, because of the excess
demand for the shares, flipping does not impose any costs on the un-
derwriters.  Second, investors who sell their allotment may not be act-
ing opportunistically.  In a hot IPO, the allotments to specific
investors may be smaller than requested and also smaller than an in-
vestor’s minimum block size.  Under these circumstances, it is under-
standable that an investor would decide to sell the allotment rather
than buy additional shares at the overheated market price.56  Indeed,
underwriters may even be pleased to see flipping in hot IPOs because
it generates volume and commissions.57
Yet the expectation and the commitment seem to extend beyond
the first few days.  In placing shares, the anecdotal evidence described
earlier suggests that issuers and underwriters are, in fact, seeking long-
term shareholders, not simply trying to avoid flippers.58  Although Ag-
garwal’s data show a low level of flipping after IPOs by both institu-
tions and individuals, the data do not extend far enough to allow the
calculation of average holding periods.
Viewed in this way, the allocation of shares in an underwriting
provides an example of directly building a shareholder base, an effort
that is costly but that presumably provides benefits in return.  The key
benefit provided by selling to long-term shareholders seems to be sta-
bility in the secondary trading market for shares: stable shareholders
limit the number of shares traded.  From this perspective, a good
shareholder is one who will hold the allotted shares for the long term
and thereby provide stability in the development of a secondary trad-
ing market.59
Directly limiting the transfer of shares would not achieve the
same stability in the secondary trading market for at least two reasons.
First, it would undermine the emergence of a genuine secondary mar-
ket.  Second, it would muddy the desired signal: shareholders who are
54 See Aggarwal, supra note 50, at 116 (citing Order Approving a Proposed Rule R
Change Implementing the Initial Public Offering Tracking System, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-37208, 61 SEC Docket 2365 (May 13, 1996)).
55 See id. at 115.
56 See id. at 115, 127.
57 See id.
58 See Jenkinson & Jones, supra note 43, at 1496 fig.4. R
59 See Jenkinson & Jones, supra note 44, at 2310. R
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legally prohibited from selling will not convey confidence in the cur-
rent price.60  Instead, underwriters rely on softer, blurrier restraints
underpinned by repeat interactions and motivated by investors’ desire
to be offered underpriced shares.
2. Controlling the Dark Side of Going Public
The general risks of going public are twofold.  First, when a com-
pany goes public, shareholders who have an incentive and the ability
to monitor (such as the original venture capitalists) are replaced with
dispersed shareholders without the incentives or skills to do so.  This
can lead to an increase in managerial slack.  Second, corporations
sometimes go public and then fail to grow to efficient scale.  When
this happens, they end up as “zombie” companies: ignored by analysts
and investors, bereft of many of the key levers of corporate govern-
ance.  Such companies are often poorly governed.  Because these risks
are well known and because, on the whole, the cost is borne by the
selling shareholders, the law does not worry much about them.
The collapse of the dot-com bubble revealed some lesser-known
practices, including “spinning” and “laddering.”61  In spinning, the
underwriter offers shares of a hot IPO to top executives of clients or
potential clients, with the hope or expectation of future business.62
This sort of share allocation hurts the issuer in two ways: first, by allo-
cating shares to buyers likely to flip instead of to long-term investors;
and second, by depriving the issuer of the quid pro quo for the under-
pricing.  It also hurts the firm for which the buyers work, because it
diverts an investment opportunity that the buyer’s employer could
have exploited and introduces a distortion into the choice of invest-
ment banker.  Spinning can be attacked under state law as a diversion
of corporate opportunity as well as under various agency theories
(and against the banker as aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty).63  In some instances, favored clients were expected to return
some of their profits to the underwriter—a practice that, if undis-
closed, violates federal securities law.64
60 Although, one can also imagine an offsetting effect where shareholders willing to
accept selling restrictions would manifest an extra level of confidence in the current price
that might more than compensate for any decrease in confidence.
61 See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
711, 738–44, 751–54 (2005) (surveying the problematic practices of spinning and
laddering).
62 Id. at 738.
63 See, e.g., In re eBay, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521, at *5
(Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2004); Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic
Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583,
632–43 (2004).
64 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(q)(a)(1) (2006); SEC v. Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., No.
1:02–00090–RWR, 2002 WL 479836, at *1–4 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2002); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a–3
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The related practice of laddering (also known as a “tie-in”) is
even more obviously illegal: in laddering, the recipient of an alloca-
tion in a hot IPO agrees, explicitly or implicitly, to buy additional
shares in the secondary market, as a way of increasing volume and
pushing up the price.65  As the SEC has reminded market partici-
pants, such agreements violate Regulation M (which governs IPO sta-
bilization activities) and may well violate antifraud and
antimanipulation provisions.66
Although this sort of “funny business” interferes with creating the
desired shareholder base in an IPO, and while it may have been fairly
widespread during the dot-com boom, even then the magnitude
seems not to have been large.  Aggarwal’s data, which come from the
early stages of the dot-com boom (May 1997 to June 1998), show a
system of share allocation that largely creates the sort of shareholder
base that issuers seek: mostly institutional with a degree of individual
participation.67  While the system is subject to abuse, especially during
frothy periods,68 the existing legal framework is well adapted to con-
trol those abuses.  More importantly for our purposes, the framework
does not interfere with targeting IPO allocations to desirable
shareholders.69
B. “Relational” Investing
Another version of direct recruitment is the private placement of
shares with an investor thought to be of a good type.  Goldman Sachs’
sale of $5 billion in preferred stock to Warren Buffett is a classic exam-
ple.70  In the late 1980s and 1990s, commentators referred to this sort
of share placement as “relational investing,” and it had a period of
(2011); Complaint at 1, SEC v. Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., No. 1:02–00090–RWR, 2002
WL 479836 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2002), 2002 WL 32151973; FINRA Rule 2110. Standards of Com-
mercial Honor and Principles of Trade, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/
en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=5504 (last visited Mar. 10, 2012); FINRA
Rule 3110. Books and Records, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/dis-
play/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3734 (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
65 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Should Issuers Be on the Hook for Laddering? An
Empirical Analysis of the IPO Market Manipulation Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 179, 179
(2004).
66 SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 10 (Aug. 25, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/interps/le-
gal/slbmr10.htm (“reminding” underwriters and broker-dealers that tie-in agreements vio-
late Rules 101 and 102 of Regulation M and “may violate other anti-fraud and anti-
manipulation provisions of the federal securities laws”).
67 See Aggarwal, supra note 50, at 116–17, 117 tbl.1. R
68 See Hurt, supra note 61, at 773 n.350, 788, 790. R
69 However, some of the more radical proposals in response to these abuses could
interfere with targeting IPO allocations to desirable shareholders. See id. at 778, 787–90.
70 See White, supra note 24. R
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popularity.71  More recently, when practiced by private equity funds, it
is called “PIPE” investing (Private Investment in Public Equity).72
Warren Buffett has acted as a relational investor for decades.  He
has a long track record of being supportive of management (which
management views as a good characteristic) while also being a savvy
judge of companies.  He also acts quickly.  His attributes made him
the perfect (and maybe the only) relational investor for Goldman
Sachs during the panic in the Fall of 2008.  Goldman’s challenge was
to convince the markets that it had adequate funding sources even
during the credit crunch and would thus not go broke.  Buffett’s in-
vestment provided credible reassurance: markets viewed him as a
smart investor who would not invest without confidence that Goldman
was sound; if he was wrong, he would lose his investment.73
Because Buffett’s reputation is valuable to him both personally
and in being offered opportunities to buy businesses for Berkshire
Hathaway, Goldman could count on him to uphold his side of the
bargain.  In addition, he has a long track record of doing so.
But Buffett’s services do not come cheaply.  Berkshire Hathaway
invested $5 billion in exchange for perpetual preferred stock with a
10% annual dividend and warrants.74  It has proved to be an ex-
tremely profitable investment.75
As was clear in the earlier period of relational investing, the chal-
lenges include identifying a good type, ensuring that the good type
stays good, and negotiating the price for being good.76  As the Buffett
example shows, a good relational investor can provide substantial
value to the firm.  Because Goldman’s interest was in securing Buf-
fett’s support at the lowest price it could pay, while Buffett sought a
profitable investment, the arm’s-length bargaining protected share-
holder interests.  Buffett’s reputation and his limited ability to exer-
cise any control bonded his commitment.
71 See Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 987, 1000–06 (1994).
72 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., PIPEs, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 381, 381–85 (2007).
73 See White, supra note 24. R
74 See The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (Sept. 23,
2008) [hereinafter Godman Sachs’ Form 8-K].
75 To escape from paying the 10% annual dividend, Goldman recently redeemed the
preferred stock at the stated redemption price ($5.5 billion) plus a one-time preferred
dividend of $1.64 billion. See Press Release, Goldman Sachs, Goldman Sachs to Redeem
Preferred Stock Issued to Berkshire Hathaway (Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://
www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases/current/redeem-stock.html.
Berkshire continues to hold the five-year warrant to purchase 43,478,260 shares of
Goldman common stock at $115 per share.  Goldman Sachs’ Form 8-K, supra note 74.  As R
of March 2012, Goldman was trading for $122.93 per share. Goldman Sachs Group Inc.,
NYSE EURONEXT (Mar. 17, 2012, 4:33 PM), http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lcddata.
html?ticker=GS.
76 See Rock, supra note 71, at 1024. R
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But relational investing can also go wrong.  Sometimes it fails be-
cause the contract negotiated by the firm and the investor creates a
misalignment of incentives.  Thus, in the toxic convertible PIPEs
cases, the conversion option gave investors an incentive to act in ways
that hurt the company.77
Sometimes relational investing can serve the interests of the man-
agers (e.g., by providing “takeover protection”) without serving the
interests of the shareholders.  In an earlier period of relational invest-
ing, examples of this sort of takeover protection emerged.78  As I have
discussed elsewhere, in this sort of relational investment, arm’s-length
negotiations—the typical hallmark of a fair transaction—will not suf-
fice to protect the shareholders.79  As in any protection racket, while
arm’s-length negotiations will occur—the buyer of protection (the
managers) will seek the lowest price for the most protection from the
seller (the relational investor), who has opposite goals—those negoti-
ations will not assure that the agreement reached benefits the share-
holders.80  In sum, there are minimal specific legal protections against
corrupt relational investing, with most of the work of limiting such
activities achieved by general techniques such as contractual provi-
sions that align the interests of managers and shareholders.81
C. Sale of Control Blocks
Yet another “recruitment” device is the identification and recruit-
ment of a new control shareholder.  The personality and characteris-
tics of a controlling shareholder can be important to the success of a
firm.  A controlling shareholder who seeks to manage the company
well has the advantage of large financial incentives to succeed and the
ability to implement plans.  This can be of great benefit to noncon-
trolling shareholders.  On the other hand, control shareholders who
focus on extracting non–pro rata distributions at the expense of non-
controlling shareholders can cause a great deal of harm, both to the
noncontrolling shareholders and to the firm itself.  The personality of
the control shareholder, in turn, will affect what sorts of investors are
willing to invest in noncontrolling shares of the company.
The transfer of a control block can thus be of great importance in
the creation or preservation of a “shareholder base.”  In particular,
the transfer from a bad controlling shareholder to a good controlling
77 See Deepa Nayini, Comment, The Toxic Convertible: Establishing Manipulation in the
Wake of Short Sales, 54 EMORY L.J. 721, 747 (2005).
78 See Rock, supra note 71, at 990. R
79 Id. at 1011–12.
80 See id.
81 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill:
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 896 (2002).
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shareholder can be very valuable to the firm, while the reverse can
injure it.
What does Delaware law do to facilitate such transfers?  Delaware
law makes clear that, within limits, a controlling shareholder may sell
its control block for a premium.82  The limits are not entirely clear,
however.  Under Delaware law:
[W]hen the circumstances would alert a reasonably prudent person
to a risk that his buyer is dishonest or in some material respect not
truthful, a duty devolves upon the seller to make such inquiry as a
reasonably prudent person would make, and generally to exercise
care so that others who will be affected by his actions should not be
injured by wrongful conduct.83
Less certain is how far the controlling shareholder’s right to sell
control extends beyond the naked sale of the stock.  In In re Digex, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, the court held that when the controlling share-
holder leaned on the board of directors of the controlled corporation
to waive the antitakeover protections of section 203 of Delaware’s
General Corporate Law, the board’s decision would have to meet the
standards of “entire fairness.”84  Delaware case law is undecided, how-
ever, about whether a controlling shareholder who uses its control to
induce the company to cooperate in due diligence efforts must meet
the standards of entire fairness.85
Whatever the outer limits of a controller’s right to sell, Delaware
leaves a large amount of flexibility in the substitution of one control-
ler for another.  This presents an interesting puzzle: although Dela-
ware is relatively permissive of the sale of control blocks (in
comparison to other countries),86 sales of control are rare.  The best
explanation is that, for a variety of reasons (e.g., Delaware’s limits on
82 Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp., 901 A.2d 751, 758 (Del. Ch. 2006); Harris v.
Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 234 (Del. Ch. 1990); In re Sea-Land Corp. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No.
8453, 1987 WL 11283, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 22, 1987); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 794 (2003).
83 Harris, 582 A.2d at 235. A minority view holds that the seller must have actual
notice. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 647 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
84 789 A.2d 1176, 1207–09 (Del. Ch. 2000).
85 In Harris v. Carter, Chancellor Allen noted the Delaware principle that “when a
shareholder presumes to exercise control over a corporation, to direct its actions, that
shareholder assumes a fiduciary duty of the same kind as that owed by a director to the
corporation.” Harris, 582 A.2d at 234.  This principle could ground a duty to use such
control for the benefit of all the shareholders and not just the controlling shareholder.
Gilson and Gordon, recognizing that a doctrinal foundation for such a claim exists under
both Delaware law and the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance,
argue that such actions by the controlling shareholder should not limit the controlling
shareholder’s ability to sell its shares for a premium.  See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 82, R
at 810–14.
86 REINIER KRAAKMAN, JOHN ARMOUR, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, HENRY HANSMANN,
GERARD HERTIG, KLAUS HOPT, HIDEKI KANDA & EDWARD ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 256–63 (2d ed. 2009).
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related party transactions, cultural factors, etc.), private benefits of
control are low in the United States.  With few opportunities for im-
proper gain, purchasers seem generally to prefer to buy 100% of the
company to capture 100% of the gains of improved performance.87
D. Traditional Investor Relations
1. What is Investor Relations?
Investor relations (IR) is now an established part of the corporate
landscape, although not part of what we generally think of as “corpo-
rate governance.”  Its history is fairly recent.  Although the first com-
pany to have an IR department was GE, which has had one since
1953,88 the field exploded during the 1990s.  A professional organiza-
tion, the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI), was established
in 1969, and now has “more than 3,500 members represent[ing] 2,000
publicly held companies.”89  It was not until 1994 that a majority of
Fortune 500 companies had an official IR function.90  By the late
1990s, IR had become standard at large companies and was increas-
ingly recognized in smaller companies.  The growth of IR thus tracks
the emergence of institutional investors as an important force in cor-
porate governance.91
Although originally regarded as part of the public relations func-
tion, with most IR managers drawn from that field, by the late 1990s
the profile began to change.  More and more IR managers began
their careers as analysts or investment bankers.92  At the same time,
because the IR group must be well informed to communicate effec-
tively with shareholders, it has become more common for the chief IR
officer to be “involved in the top management strategy, planning and
operational meetings.”93  Moreover, as the “voice of the market,” the
chief IR officer commonly meets with the board to explain the “mar-
ket’s” view of the company.94
87 See generally Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An Interna-
tional Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 538, 554–56 tbl.III, 574–84 (2004) (documenting cross-
country differences in private benefits); Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights
and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325, 341–48 (2003) (same).
88 William F. Mahoney, The Evolution of IR Practice: IR Professionals Take Changing Role
in Stride, 3 INVESTOR REL. Q. 4, 5 (2000).
89 About Us, NAT’L INVESTOR REL. INST., http://www.niri.org/FunctionalMenu/About.
aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
90 See Hayagreeva Rao & Kumar Sivakumar, Institutional Sources of Boundary-Spanning
Structures: The Establishment of Investor Relations Departments in the Fortune 500 Industrials, 10
ORG. SCI. 27, 28 (1999).
91 Kahan & Rock, supra note 15, at 995–98. R
92 See GREGORY S. MILLER, DANIELA BEYERSDORFER & ANDERS SJÖMAN, IR AT BP: INVES-
TOR RELATIONS AND INFORMATION RECONNAISSANCE 3 (2006).
93 Id.
94 See id.
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IR is about managing a firm’s relationships with its shareholders.
As described by NIRI, “[i]nvestor relations is a strategic management
responsibility that integrates finance, communication, marketing and
securities law compliance to enable the most effective two-way com-
munication between a company, the financial community, and other
constituencies, which ultimately contributes to a company’s securities
achieving fair valuation.”95  This vision of IR contrasts with using pub-
lic relations to keep the stock price high, a form of IR that NIRI and
leading IR practitioners condemn.96
Although IR can be viewed as a communications function, it also
involves shareholder recruitment, stability, and conditioning.  Accord-
ingly, I will divide my discussion of IR somewhat artificially between
recruitment of shareholders, discussed here, and the “shaping” of
shareholders, discussed below.
IR is first and foremost a communications function: to provide
information to analysts and investors so as to attract them to the firm.
For public companies at risk of being ignored, this provides tremen-
dous value.  By reducing the asymmetry of information, IR can in-
crease liquidity and, in turn, increase share prices.97  For public
companies without a wide following, the IR strategy typically starts
with encouraging current shareholders to be more active and building
a retail following.98  In implementing these strategies, IR professionals
typically use direct mail, press releases, and other attempts to get press
coverage.99  With greater visibility usually comes greater interest by
analysts and, if successful, greater interest by institutional investors.100
For companies that already have liquidity and visibility, IR efforts
are somewhat different.  As with small companies, communication is
the core of the function.  But with analysts already following the com-
pany, the role shifts to interacting with analysts—providing them with
the information they need and making sure they understand the in-
formation they have.101  Here, again, IR professionals talk about tell-
ing a clear and consistent story about the company.102
95 About Us, supra note 89. R
96 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 92, at 2; Brian J. Bushee & Gregory S. Miller, Investor R
Relations, Firm Visibility, and Investor Following 1, 9 (Jan. 2005) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=643223 (“Many IR professionals noted that
they will not accept clients whose management is only looking for a short-term boost in
stock price without the intention of developing a longer-term IR strategy.”).
97 See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 4, at 246; Yakov Amihud, Haim Mendelson & R
Beni Lauterbach, Market Microstructure and Securities Values: Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange, 45 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 371 (1997); Michael J. Brennan & Claudia Tamarowski,
Investor Relations, Liquidity, and Stock Prices, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2000, at 26, 31–32.
98 See Bushee & Miller, supra note 96, at 11–12. R
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See Brennan & Tamarowski, supra note 97, at 27. R
102 See Bushee & Miller, supra note 96, at 10. R
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Berkshire Hathaway, as in many other areas, provides a distinctive
alternative to conventional wisdom.  Warren Buffet’s annual share-
holder letters provide a straightforward and consistent description of
his investment approach and of Berkshire Hathaway’s results.  Equally
important are the communications Berkshire Hathaway does not pro-
vide: no quarterly or annual guidance on revenues, earnings, or other
financing information; no conference calls, analyst meetings, or inves-
tor conferences.103
Buffet has consciously sought to maintain a shareholder base of
long-term individual holders and has succeeded: approximately 80%
of Berkshire’s Class A common stock (the original, high-voting stock)
is held by individuals, compared to 40% of General Electric’s;104 in
2007, less than 15% of the company’s outstanding shares traded, com-
pared to 109% for Exxon Mobil.105
Indeed, at least once a firm achieves reasonable visibility and li-
quidity—something that most publicly held firms probably do not
achieve—the possibilities for IR expand.  In an interesting Harvard
case on British Petroleum (BP), BP’s IR Officer argued strongly that
the market view of, for example, the future of the oil business or the
level of investment by competitors, could usefully be incorporated
into the internal BP planning models, at the very least as a check, and
potentially even as an independent source of information.106  Another
approach, as illustrated by Berkshire Hathaway, is for IR to focus on
recruiting good shareholders, discouraging bad shareholders, and
teaching shareholders of an uncertain type to be good sharehold-
ers.107  One sees aspects of this role in IR efforts to build a share-
holder base of long-term, patient shareholders who understand the
firm’s business and can properly put developments, both good and
bad, in context.108  Recently, proxy statements are beginning to at-
tempt to educate shareholders through something like a “Directors’
Discussion and Analysis” section as a supplement to the mandatory
“Management’s Discussion and Analysis” in annual reports.109  Like-
103 See DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, THE MANAGEMENT OF BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY
21 (2009).
104 See id. at 20–21.
105 See id. at 22.
106 MILLER ET AL., supra note 92, at 9–12. R
107 See, e.g., Warren E. Buffett, An Owner’s Manual, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. (1996),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/ownman.pdf (describing shareholders’ role at Berk-
shire Hathaway).
108 See, e.g., id. at 1.
109 See, e.g., PRUDENTIAL FIN., INC., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS AND
2011 PROXY STATEMENT 3–5 (2011), http://www3.prudential.com/annualreport/re-
port2011/proxy/images/Prudential-Proxy2011.pdf; John C. Wilcox, Preparing for the 2011
Proxy Season, DIRECTOR NOTES (The Conference Bd., New York, N.Y.), Nov. 2010, at 4,
available at http://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=DN-017-10.pdf&
type=subsite (arguing in favor of providing a Director Discussion and Analysis).
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wise, with the rise of hedge funds and other “disruptive” investors, IR
offices share the task of explaining to the shareholders why manage-
ment’s plans are, in fact, better than the alternatives hedge funds
present.110
2. The Legal Framework
Because the IR function is, first and foremost, a communications
function, the federal securities laws provide the basic regulatory
framework, and a substantial part of a typical IR textbook is devoted to
an overview of that legal framework.  Thus, one guide to running an
effective IR department covers the basics of the Securities Exchange
Act, including separate chapters on disclosure, Management’s Discus-
sion & Analysis, forward-looking statements, and proxy solicitations.111
In addition, it covers related regulation including state blue-sky laws
and stock exchange listing requirements.112
Over the last decade, two developments have significantly compli-
cated the function, both of which emerged out of a concern for equity
analyst “independence”:  Regulation FD and the 2003 Global Re-
search Settlement.
Regulation FD, which became effective in 2000, targets “selective
disclosure” to investors and analysts.113  From the SEC’s perspective,
there was a problem that reflected both its sense of the practice of IR
as well as a judgment about that practice:
[W]e have become increasingly concerned about the selective dis-
closure of material information by issuers.  As reflected in recent
publicized reports, many issuers are disclosing important nonpublic
information, such as advance warnings of earnings results, to securi-
ties analysts or selected institutional investors or both, before mak-
ing full disclosure of the same information to the general public.
Where this has happened, those who were privy to the information
beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense
of those kept in the dark.
110 Shareholders may have conflicting interests regarding transparency.  For example,
a large shareholder with private information on firm value may prefer that the firm be
opaque so as to maintain an informational advantage over other shareholders to generate
trading profits.
111 STEVEN M. BRAGG, RUNNING AN EFFECTIVE INVESTOR RELATIONS DEPARTMENT: A COM-
PREHENSIVE GUIDE 94–102, 122–27, 209–23 (2010).
112 Id. at 183, 206–08.
113 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101 (2011).  Prior to Regulation FD, the legal treatment of selec-
tive disclosure was unsettled.  While the SEC viewed selective disclosure as a violation of
Rule 10b-5, the courts took quite a different approach. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666
n.27 (1983) (discussing Rule 10b-5 violations); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18
(2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]here is no per se rule requiring the issuance of an injunction upon the
showing of a past [section 10(b)] violation.”); Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12813, 48
SEC Docket 739, 1991 WL 296537 (noting the SEC’s request to have a CEO permanently
enjoined from violating Rule 10b–5).
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. . . .
Regulation FD is also designed to address another threat to the in-
tegrity of our markets: the potential for corporate management to
treat material information as a commodity to be used to gain or
maintain favor with particular analysts or investors.  As noted in the
Proposing Release, in the absence of a prohibition on selective dis-
closure, analysts may feel pressured to report favorably about a com-
pany or otherwise slant their analysis in order to have continued
access to selectively disclosed information.  We are concerned, in
this regard, with reports that analysts who publish negative views of
an issuer are sometimes excluded by that issuer from calls and meet-
ings to which other analysts are invited.114
In Regulation FD, the SEC essentially banned selective disclosure
by mandating that an issuer who discloses material nonpublic infor-
mation to a securities market professional—including both analysts
and investors—must make simultaneous public disclosure of the same
information if the disclosure was intentional, or prompt disclosure if
unintentional.115  In the adopting release, the SEC made clear that
earnings guidance would be a violation of the rules.116
The regulation of equity analysts was spurred by the dot-com col-
lapse, which revealed some appalling duplicity by buy-side equity ana-
lysts who responded to pressure to issue positive recommendations for
investment-banking clients.117  Elliot Spitzer, then–New York attorney
general, went after the large brokerage houses and reached a “Global
Research Settlement” in 2003.118  Congress, through the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, mandated regulation of analysts by the SEC.119  The SEC
and the exchanges adopted a series of measures designed to insulate
analysts from pressure from investment bankers.120  The goal of these
various regulatory or quasi-regulatory initiatives was to mandate ana-
lyst independence.121
These two regulatory developments had a substantial impact on
how IR professionals performed their work.  Regulation FD prohib-
ited the informal, confidential relationship between IR officers and
select analysts or investors that had been common and that allowed
the IR officer to present in detail, and without fear of general disclo-
114 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Ex-
change Act Release No. 43154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24599, 65 Fed. Reg.
51,716, 51,716–17 (Aug. 24, 2000).
115 See § 243.100(a).
116 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.
117 See Jill E. Fisch, Fiduciary Duties and the Analyst Scandals, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1083,
1083–84 (2007).
118 Id. at 1085.
119 Id.
120 See Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 39, 70
(2007).
121 See id. at 42.
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sure, the firm’s plans, problems, and results.  Instead, anything told to
any particular analyst or investor has to be publicly disclosed.  From
the perspective of the IR community, Regulation FD was a huge
change that threatened to chill the production of information and
firms’ relationships with analysts and investors.122
The 2003 Global Research Settlement, against the backdrop of
Regulation FD, affected IR programs in a somewhat different way: the
number of analysts declined significantly and a large number of pub-
lic companies were no longer followed by any analyst.  In a 2006 re-
port to the SEC, the Advisory Committee on Small Public Companies
reported that
approximately 1,200 of the 3,200 NASDAQ-listed companies, and
35% of all public companies, receive no analyst coverage at all.  Sta-
tistics provided by the SEC Office of Economic Analysis indicate
that in 2004 approximately 52% of companies with a market capital-
ization between $125 million and $750 million and 83% of compa-
nies with a market capitalization less than $125 million had no
analyst coverage.123
It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze in detail the merits
of either Regulation FD or the 2003 Global Research Settlement.
What I can say, however, is that the combined effect has created a real
problem for smaller public companies.  The loss of analyst coverage
adds to the other governance problems that afflict such companies
and can hardly leave shareholders better off.
3. The Finance Framework
Merton’s approach, noted above, provides a useful framework for
thinking somewhat more systematically about the effect of regulation
on IR.  Gomes, Gorton, and Madureira, drawing on Merton, divide
the transmission of information from firms to markets into four
channels:
122 See Boris Feldman, Frequently Asked Questions About Regulation FD, 3 INVESTOR REL.
Q., no. 4, 2000 at 86, 86; Harvey L. Pitt, Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Jonathan P. Scott & Daniel
H. Anixt, Preparing to Implement Regulation FD, the SEC’s Selective Disclosure Rule, 3 INVESTOR
REL. Q., no. 4, 2000 at 82, 82; Louis M. Thompson, Jr., Regulation Fair Disclosure: Unintended
Consequences and Emerging Practices, 4 INVESTOR REL. Q., no. 1, 2001 at 4, 4–5; Editorial Staff,
Editorial, Goodbye, 2001: A Look Back at a Difficult Year Reg. FD, Pro Forma and Credibility Issues
Dominate the Corporate Disclosure Landscape, INVESTOR REL. BUS., Jan. 14, 2002, at 1 (“An
audience survey on an Investor Broadcast Network Regulation FD Webcast found that
while the disclosure rule made no difference to the amount of information companies
were disclosing, it was succeeding in ruining many relationships between companies and
analysts.”); Howard Stock, Year in Review: A Look Back at the Events That Shaped 2002, INVES-
TOR REL. BUS., Jan. 13, 2003, at 2.
123 SEC, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO
THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 72 n.144 (2006) (citation omit-
ted), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf.
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(1) [F]irms, in addition to mandatory disclosures, can disclose in-
formation to the public voluntarily (e.g., earnings pre-announce-
ments); (2) firms can selectively disclose information, e.g., phone
calls, or one-on-one meetings; (3) “sell-side” analysts can produce
research which is released to the public, e.g., analysts reports; (4)
private information can be produced by outsiders, “informed trad-
ers,” who then trade on the basis of their information.124
This sets the landscape of the IR function.  Items (1), (2), and (3) can
all involve the IR officer in one way or another.
Within this framework, one can see how legal reform has affected
IR.  As described above, Regulation FD prohibits channel 2, while the
2003 Global Research Settlement constrained channel 3.  Because
there are some sorts of information that can be better conveyed in
one-to-one meetings with trusted interlocutors than in more public
settings,125 Regulation FD was expected to, and has in fact, changed
the information environment within which firms function.  Now, in
place of closed meetings or conference calls, firms must choose be-
tween disclosing to an open forum or not disclosing at all.  Regulation
FD caused “a reallocation of information-producing resources” which
affected asset pricing.126  Gomes, Gorton, and Madureira “document
that small firms on average lost 17 percent of their analyst following,
while big firms gained 7 percent, on average.”127  Moreover,
the stocks of small firms that completely lost analyst coverage after
Reg FD experienced significant increases in the cost of capital,
while small stocks with no previous analyst coverage—which pre-
sumably did not have any analysts benefiting from selective disclo-
sure pre-FD—experienced no significant change in the cost of
capital.  Moreover, we find that more complex firms (using intangi-
ble assets as a proxy for complexity) are more adversely affected by
Reg FD than less complex firms.128
E. Exploiting Clientele Effects
The Merton model and the Amihud and Mendelson model both
predict various sorts of segmentation of the shareholder population.
This segmentation has led to the analysis of various sorts of “clientele
124 Armando Gomes, Gary Gorton & Leonardo Madureira, SEC Regulation Fair Disclo-
sure, Information, and the Cost of Capital, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 300, 301 (2007).
125 See id. at 324 (“Bushee et al. (2004) empirically find that firms with more complex
information (as proxied for by the level of intangible assets) were more likely to use closed
conference calls to disseminate information in the pre-FD period (i.e., calls that restrict
access to invited professionals, typically buy- and sell-side analysts).” (citing Brian J. Bushee,
Dawn A. Matsumoto & Gregory S. Miller, Managerial and Investor Responses to Disclosure Regu-
lation: The Case of Reg FD and Conference Calls, 79 ACCT. REV. 617 (2004))).
126 Id. at 302.
127 Id.
128 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-4\CRN404.txt unknown Seq: 27 26-APR-12 10:46
2012] SHAREHOLDER EUGENICS 875
effects,” a kind of selection effect.129  To what extent can public firms
exploit selection effects in shaping their shareholder bases?  How does
the law create or influence these selection effects?
1. Dividend Policy
Modigliani and Miller (M & M) showed that in perfect and com-
plete capital markets, dividend policy will not affect firm value.130  But
capital markets are neither perfect nor complete.  In the wake of M &
M, there has been a cottage industry engaged in trying to understand
dividend policy within their framework.  Because one assumption of
the M & M result was “no taxes,”131 one approach has been to ask
whether the presence of taxes can explain the observed practice of
paying dividends, in preference to other corporate payout methods,
principally share repurchases.132
In many periods for certain investors, dividends have been taxed
differently than capital gains.  For example, dividends received by in-
dividual investors have often been taxed as ordinary income while cap-
ital gains were taxed at a substantially lower rate when realized.133  By
contrast, for corporations, the opposite has been the case: intercorpo-
rate dividends have been taxed at a low rate, while capital gains were
taxed at the higher, corporate income tax rate.134  Could these differ-
ences in tax treatment explain the pattern of corporate payouts?  If so,
then dividend policy could be used to select for a particular sort of
shareholder.
In the very active and rich theoretical literature, a variety of mod-
els have sought to explain dividend policy as a result of, or an attempt
to attract, particular shareholder “clienteles.”135  In models in which
minimizing taxes drives investment decisions, individuals will hold
low-dividend stocks, corporations will hold high-dividend stocks, while
medium-dividend stocks will be held by tax-free investors or investors
who can otherwise avoid tax.136  From the perspective of these models,
129 See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 4, at 224; Merton, supra note 5, at 488. R
130 The classic analysis comes from Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of
Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).  For
the application to dividends, see Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy,
Growth, and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411, 411–15 (1961).
131 See Miller & Modigliani, supra note 130, at 411–32. R
132 See Franklin Allen & Roni Michaely, Payout Policy 50 (Apr. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=309589.
133 Until 2008, dividends were taxed as ordinary income.  From 2008 to 2012, qualified
dividends have been taxed at the same rate as capital gains—15%. See id. at 24.  Even at
equal tax rates, stock buybacks are tax advantaged because they allow the taxpayer to
choose to defer payment of tax on the gain (by not selling). See id. at 24 n.4.
134 “Under the current tax code, 30% of dividends are taxed.” Id. at 24.
135 See id. at 22–26.
136 See Franklin Allen, Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Dividends Based on
Tax Clienteles, 55 J. FIN. 2499, 2500–01 (2000); Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber, Marginal
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the puzzle is why we observe individual investors in high tax brackets
holding substantial amounts of dividend-paying stocks.  A variety of
models have sought to explain this puzzle, many of which have recog-
nized that investors can adopt active tax minimization strategies and,
therefore, not have to limit themselves to particular sorts of stocks.  In
light of this, Allen and Michaely conclude that “a pure dividend-re-
lated tax . . . clientele does not exist.”137
Of course, there may be other dividend–clientele effects.  Practi-
tioners have long observed that individual investors prefer to own divi-
dend-paying stocks, a view for which there is some supporting
evidence.138  Some have tried to explain these observations based on
investor behavioral biases.139
For our purposes, the issue is not whether there is a theoretical
basis for thinking that clientele affects the shareholder base.  There
clearly is.  The more important question is which clienteles are signifi-
cant?  Pure tax-driven clientele effects do not seem to be observable,
while the practitioner belief that widow-and-orphan investors gravitate
towards dividend-paying stocks is fairly persuasive.140  What is the mag-
nitude of the effect?  To what extent can managers use divi-
dend–clientele effects in shaping the shareholder base?  Although the
evidence for any strong overall average effect is lacking, there do seem
to be situations in which the choice whether or not to pay dividends
or to continue to pay dividends can have a significant effect on the
shareholder base.  Specifically, to the extent that individual investors
are attracted to dividend-paying stocks, companies that seek individual
investors as shareholders—perhaps because of a belief, like Buffet’s,
that they are more reliable—can increase their proportion in the
shareholder base by paying dividends (although Berkshire Hathaway
does not, itself, pay regular dividends).141
Stockholder Tax Rates and the Clientele Effect, 52 REV. ECON. & STAT. 68, 68–74 (1970); Robert
H. Litzenberger & Krishna Ramaswamy, The Effect of Personal Taxes and Dividends on Capital
Asset Prices: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 163, 190 (1979); Allen & Michaely,
supra note 132, at 24. R
137 Allen & Michaely, supra note 132, at 49. R
138 See, e.g., Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo & Douglas J. Skinner, Corporate Payout
Policy, 3 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 95, 207–10 (2008); Ravi Jain, Institutional and Individual
Investor Preferences for Dividends and Share Repurchases, 59 J. ECON. & BUS. 406, 426–27
(2007).
139 See, e.g., Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, A Catering Theory of Dividends, 59 J. FIN.
1125, 1158–60 (2004); Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Appearing and Disappearing Divi-
dends: The Link to Catering Incentives, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 284–87 (2004); DeAngelo et al.,
supra note 138, at 192–201; Hersh M. Shefrin & Meir Statman, Explaining Investor Preference R
for Cash Dividends, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 253, 258–76 (1984).
140 See DeAngelo et al., supra note 138, at 208. R
141 Berkshire Hathaway, WARREN BUFFETT SECRETS, http://www.buffettsecrets.com/berk-
shire.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
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2. The Choice of Country and Stock Exchange
The phenomenon of “home bias,” another form of segmentation,
is well documented.  Investors, including the most sophisticated inves-
tors, disproportionately (and suboptimally) invest in their own coun-
try’s companies.142  Customers of Regional Bell Operating Companies
disproportionately invested in their local company over other Re-
gional Bell Operating Companies (when there still were local Bell Op-
erating Companies!).143  Portfolio managers tend to prefer closer
companies over farther companies.144  One of the explanations for
cross-listing on different stock exchanges is to broaden the investor
base.  Foerster and Karolyi show that cross-listing by non-U.S. firms on
U.S. exchanges results, on average, in an increase of around 28% in
the number of U.S. shareholders.145
Besides these geographic effects, there are other ways in which
investors sort themselves.  NASDAQ is the launching pad for technol-
ogy companies and thus attracts investors interested in technology
companies.  Goldman Sachs’ GS Tradable Unregistered Equity OTC
Market is an all-institutional investor marketplace in which unregis-
tered shares can be traded among qualified investors.
Given these various forms of “home bias,” the choice of corporate
headquarters, domicile, and listing can become, at least to a degree,
the choice of shareholder base.  When an Israel-based start-up wants
to go public, it often chooses the NASDAQ because of the appetite of
NASDAQ investors for technology companies.  Indeed, anticipating a
future IPO, an Israel-based technology company can ease its future
acceptance among investors who prefer Silicon Valley technology
companies (over foreign technology companies) by initially incorpo-
rating in Delaware, designating its Silicon Valley office as its headquar-
ters, and presenting itself as a Silicon Valley technology company.146
But the advantages of the familiar can play out in different ways
as well.  When a company’s products have a particular geographic fo-
cus (e.g., a European online-betting site) a company may choose to go
public in London because potential investors may well have heard of
142 See Kenneth R. French & James M. Poterba, Investor Diversification and International
Equity Markets, 81 BEHAV. FIN. 222, 222 (1991).
143 Gur Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 659, 659–61 (2001).
144 See Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference
in Domestic Portfolios, 54 J. FIN. 2045, 2045 (1999).
145 See Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, The Effects of Market Segmentation and
Investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the United States, 54 J.
FIN. 981, 987 tbl.II (1999).
146 See Edward B. Rock, Coming to America? Venture Capital, Corporate Identity, and U.S.
Securities Law, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERN-
ANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 476, 476–506 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003);
Edward B. Rock, Greenhorns, Yankees, and Cosmopolitans: Venture Capital, IPOs, Foreign Firms,
and U.S. Markets, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 711, 716–19, 743 (2001).
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the firm’s product either from product advertising, word of mouth, or
press coverage.147  Likewise, product advertising can affect share-
holder base.148
Different exchanges have different listing requirements and dif-
ferent rules for listed companies.  The NYSE prides itself on attracting
large, high-quality companies.  One understanding of the decision to
list on the NYSE is that it is a credible signal of quality that attracts the
largest, best-known institutional investors.149  To the extent this signal
is accurate, listing on the NYSE can likewise be thought of as part of a
strategy for shaping shareholder base.
3. Stock Price
Stock price itself can potentially affect the composition of the
shareholder base.  Here, the classic example is Berkshire Hathaway,
whose original, high-voting, Class A shares have never been split and
currently trade for around $120,000 per share.150  Buffet famously re-
sisted splitting shares of Berkshire Hathaway until the threatened
emergence of Berkshire Hathaway “unit trusts” (that would have sold
fractional interests in Berkshire Hathaway Class A shares to investors
who could not afford a whole share) led Berkshire to offer low voting
“Class B” shares.151  In 1983, when Berkshire’s shares were trading at
$1300 per share, Buffett devoted a portion of his annual shareholder
letter to explaining his decision:
We often are asked why Berkshire does not split its stock.  The
assumption behind this question usually appears to be that a split
would be a pro-shareholder action.  We disagree.  Let me tell you
why.
One of our goals is to have Berkshire Hathaway stock sell at a
price rationally related to its intrinsic business value.  (But note “ra-
tionally related”, not “identical”: if well-regarded companies are
generally selling in the market at large discounts from value, Berk-
147 One example is Playtech, an Israel-based supplier of online gaming software. See
About, PLAYTECH, http://www.playtech.com/html/#page/about (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
Note that a London listing, with a restriction against U.S. shareholders, also insulates
Playtech from U.S. gambling regulation. See Alistair Osborne, Playtech Game Plan Ques-
tioned; Opinion Divided About Software Supplier from Which Israeli Founder Has Taken £500m,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 14, 2011, Business, at 5.
148 See Gustavo Grullon, George Kanatas & James P. Weston, Advertising, Breadth of Own-
ership, and Liquidity, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 439, 458 (2004).
149 See Company Overview, NYSE EURONEXT, http://corporate.nyx.com/en/who-we-
are/company-overview (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
150 Berkshire Hathaway’s (BRK.A) closing price on March 11, 2012, was $118,430.
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., NYSE EURONEXT (Mar. 11, 2012, 7:18 PM), http://www.nyse.com/
about/listed/lcddata.html?ticker=BRKA.
151 See Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc.,
to Shareholders (Feb. 28, 1997), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/
1996.html.
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shire might well be priced similarly.)  The key to a rational stock
price is rational shareholders, both current and prospective.
If the holders of a company’s stock and/or the prospective buy-
ers attracted to it are prone to make irrational or emotion-based
decisions, some pretty silly stock prices are going to appear periodi-
cally.  Manic-depressive personalities produce manic-depressive val-
uations.  Such aberrations may help us in buying and selling the
stocks of other companies.  But we think it is in both your interest
and ours to minimize their occurrence in the market for Berkshire.
To obtain only high quality shareholders is no cinch.  Mrs. As-
tor could select her 400, but anyone can buy any stock.  Entering
members of a shareholder “club” cannot be screened for intellec-
tual capacity, emotional stability, moral sensitivity or acceptable
dress.  Shareholder eugenics, therefore, might appear to be a hope-
less undertaking.
In large part, however, we feel that high quality ownership can
be attracted and maintained if we consistently communicate our
business and ownership philosophy—along with no other conflicting
messages—and then let self selection follow its course.  For example,
self selection will draw a far different crowd to a musical event ad-
vertised as an opera than one advertised as a rock concert even
though anyone can buy a ticket to either.
Through our policies and communications—our “advertise-
ments”—we try to attract investors who will understand our opera-
tions, attitudes and expectations.  (And, fully as important, we try to
dissuade those who won’t.)  We want those who think of themselves
as business owners and invest in companies with the intention of
staying a long time.  And, we want those who keep their eyes fo-
cused on business results, not market prices.
Investors possessing those characteristics are in a small minor-
ity, but we have an exceptional collection of them.  I believe well
over 90%—probably over 95%—of our shares are held by those
who were shareholders of Berkshire or Blue Chip five years ago.
And I would guess that over 95% of our shares are held by investors
for whom the holding is at least double the size of their next largest.
Among companies with at least several thousand public sharehold-
ers and more than $1 billion of market value, we are almost cer-
tainly the leader in the degree to which our shareholders think and
act like owners.  Upgrading a shareholder group that possesses
these characteristics is not easy.
Were we to split the stock or take other actions focusing on
stock price rather than business value, we would attract an entering
class of buyers inferior to the exiting class of sellers.  At $1300, there
are very few investors who can’t afford a Berkshire share.  Would a
potential one-share purchaser be better off if we split 100 for 1 so he
could buy 100 shares?  Those who think so and who would buy the
stock because of the split or in anticipation of one would definitely
downgrade the quality of our present shareholder group.  (Could
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we really improve our shareholder group by trading some of our
present clear-thinking members for impressionable new ones who,
preferring paper to value, feel wealthier with nine $10 bills than
with one $100 bill?)  People who buy for non-value reasons are
likely to sell for non-value reasons.  Their presence in the picture
will accentuate erratic price swings unrelated to underlying business
developments.152
There is a lot here—including the source of this Article’s epi-
graph—that applies more generally to the possibility of “shareholder
eugenics” in a public corporation.  For present purposes, though, I
want to focus on unpacking Buffett’s argument that keeping the stock
price high will attract a better class of shareholder.  First, unlike un-
known small- or medium-sized public companies, Berkshire Hathaway
is legendary, with a reputation that builds and is built by its CEO’s
reputation.  This gives Berkshire Hathaway the luxury of worrying
about attracting the attention of the right sort of shareholders, rather
than simply attracting the attention of any shareholders.  Second, Buf-
fett, the controlling shareholder of Berkshire, can afford to, and has
the power to, pursue his own vision of the appropriate stock price and
what counts as a responsible investor.
Now consider the argument on its merits.  As noted earlier, Berk-
shire Hathaway has a remarkably stable shareholder base, with fewer
than 15% of the shares trading hands each year.  Moreover, it stands
out as having a largely individual rather than institutional shareholder
population, with some 80% of its shares in the hands of individual
investors (at a time when somewhere around 70% of all shares are in
the hands of institutional investors).153  The “manic-depressive” trad-
ers that Buffett sought to dissuade were institutional investors.  For
many years, because of the control block and the small size of the
float, Berkshire Hathaway was not included in the S&P 500 index and
thus not in the largest index funds.  This changed in January 2010
when Berkshire replaced Burlington Northern—the company it had
acquired in conjunction with a 50-for-1 split of Berkshire Class B
shares.154  But, for all the years that Berkshire was out of the index—
152 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, supra note 1. R
153 LARCKER & TAYAN, supra note 103, at 20 (noting that about 80% of Berkshire’s Class R
A common stock is held by individuals); Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, SEC, Speech
by SEC Staff: The Future of Securities Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm) (describing estimates of re-
tail ownership of as low as a little over 30%).  For a fuller discussion of the current esti-
mates of the distribution of shareholdings, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 15, at 995–98. R
154 Scott Patterson, Berkshire Hathaway Shares Added to the S&P 500 Index, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 26, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704905604575027653534
246656.html.
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as a result of the high share price—it had minimal institutional owner-
ship, which is precisely how Buffett liked it.155
The effect of stock price on shareholder base can move in the
opposite direction as well.  Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler propose a
“catering” theory of nominal stock prices in which firms supply shares
at a lower price level when investors place higher valuations on low-
price firms, and vice versa.156  To the extent that, for example, individ-
ual investors prefer shares with a low nominal price, a firm can shift its
shareholder base towards individual investors by splitting its stock to
reduce the nominal price.
4. Liquidity
In that same 1983 shareholder letter, Buffett also addressed the
“liquidity” concern:
One of the ironies of the stock market is the emphasis on activity.
Brokers, using terms such as “marketability” and “liquidity”, sing the
praises of companies with high share turnover (those who cannot
fill your pocket will confidently fill your ear).  But investors should
understand that what is good for the croupier is not good for the
customer.  A hyperactive stock market is the pickpocket of
enterprise.
For example, consider a typical company earning, say, 12% on
equity.  Assume a very high turnover rate in its shares of 100% per
year.  If a purchase and sale of the stock each extract commissions
of 1% (the rate may be much higher on low-priced stocks) and if
the stock trades at book value, the owners of our hypothetical com-
pany will pay, in aggregate, 2% of the company’s net worth annually
for the privilege of transferring ownership.  This activity does noth-
ing for the earnings of the business, and means that 1/6 of them are
lost to the owners through the “frictional” cost of transfer.  (And
this calculation does not count option trading, which would in-
crease frictional costs still further.)
. . . .
(We are aware of the pie-expanding argument that says that
such activities improve the rationality of the capital allocation pro-
cess.  We think that this argument is specious and that, on balance,
hyperactive equity markets subvert rational capital allocation and
act as pie shrinkers. Adam Smith felt that all noncollusive acts in a
free market were guided by an invisible hand that led an economy
to maximum progress; our view is that casino-type markets and hair-
trigger investment management act as an invisible foot that trips up
and slows down a forward-moving economy.)
155 See id.
156 Malcom Baker, Robin Greenwood & Jeffrey Wurgler, Catering Through Nominal
Share Prices, 64 J. FIN. 2559, 2559–63 (2009).
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Contrast the hyperactive stock with Berkshire.  The bid-and-ask
spread in our stock currently is about 30 points, or a little over 2%.
Depending on the size of the transaction, the difference between
proceeds received by the seller of Berkshire and cost to the buyer
may range downward from 4% (in trading involving only a few
shares) to perhaps 1 1/2% (in large trades where negotiation can
reduce both the market-maker’s spread and the broker’s commis-
sion).  Because most Berkshire shares are traded in fairly large
transactions, the spread on all trading probably does not average
more than 2%.
Meanwhile, true turnover in Berkshire stock (excluding inter-
dealer transactions, gifts and bequests) probably runs 3% per year.
Thus our owners, in aggregate, are paying perhaps 6/100 of 1% of
Berkshire’s market value annually for transfer privileges. By this very
rough estimate, that’s $900,000—not a small cost, but far less than
average.  Splitting the stock would increase that cost, downgrade the
quality of our shareholder population, and encourage a market
price less consistently related to intrinsic business value. We see no
offsetting advantages.157
Buffett is thus not just indifferent to Berkshire’s large bid–ask spread,
but seems positively to value it.  Is this a plausible strategy as an ele-
ment of his shareholder eugenics, or is it just perverse?
Consider Amihud and Mendelson’s model and subsequent work.
They have convincingly demonstrated that the bid–ask spread gener-
ates a clientele effect: short-term investors prefer stocks with a small
(relative) bid–ask spread, while longer-term shareholders gravitate to-
wards higher-spread assets.158  Moreover, they show that longer-term
shareholders get paid in the form of higher expected returns for giv-
ing up liquidity.159  Their explanation is entirely intuitive: sharehold-
ers who trade in and out of shares rapidly want to minimize their
transaction costs.
The implications of this liquidity effect on corporate governance
are complex.  Bhide argues that high liquidity undermines corporate
governance because unhappy shareholders exit rather than expend
resources on monitoring or exercising voice.160  Maug counters that
illiquidity will deter potential shareholder monitors from buying
157 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, supra note 1. R
158 See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 4, at 224.  Liquidity is the ease of trading a R
security.  Sources of illiquidity are various: transaction costs; demand pressure and inven-
tory risk; asymmetry of information regarding the fundamentals of the security and the
order flow; and search frictions (the difficulty of locating a counterparty).  Yakov Amihud
et  al., Liquidity and Asset Prices, 1 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 269, 270–71, 301, 340 (2005).
Liquidity is a complex and elusive concept but, to a first approximation, can be identified
with the bid–ask spread.
159 See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 4, at 229. R
160 Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 31, 31, 41–45
(1993).
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blocks, while liquidity is likely to increase shareholder monitoring by
making it easier to buy and increase blocks.161  More recently,
Edmans, Fang, and Zur have shown that liquidity will affect the choice
of governance mechanism, with high (low) liquidity tilting govern-
ance towards exit (voice).162  Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele find
that shareholder activism is more likely the more liquid the stock.163
When an investor holds a large block, illiquidity makes it more diffi-
cult for the investor to exit, thereby reducing his or her ability to trade
short term and pushing the investor to focus on long-term value and
governance by voice.  But for this to work, the potential profits must
be sufficiently large to induce the investor to acquire a hard-to-trade
block position initially.164
The Amihud and Mendelson results and the subsequent litera-
ture generate a number of intriguing shareholder base strategies.  If,
for example, a firm wishes to shift its shareholder base toward long-
term shareholders—as many companies claim—it can and should
adopt financial policies that increase (or avoid policies that decrease)
the bid–ask spread.  Although Amihud and Mendelson correctly sug-
gest that their results show that firms have an incentive to increase
their value by adopting financial policies that increase their liquidity,
their results also support the opposite strategy: by adopting financial
policies that reduce liquidity, firms can attract more patient capital.
Although firms will pay more for their capital, in return they will at-
tract longer-term holders.165
Alternatively, if firms wish to expose themselves to greater govern-
ance by exit, increase the size and number of block holdings, espe-
cially by hedge funds, and increase the amount of shareholder
activism, then efforts to increase liquidity are appropriate.  I suspect
that if one explained to directors that these are some of the benefits
of increased liquidity, they might well be skeptical of the wisdom of
such efforts.
Buffett seems to have adopted the first strategy as he crafts his
optimal shareholder base.  Given the Amihud and Mendelson result,
161 Ernst Maug, Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off Between Liquidity and
Control?, 53 J. FIN. 65, 68 (1998).
162 Alex Edmans Vivian W. Fang & Emanuel Zur, The Effect of Liquidity on Governance
1–8 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 319/2011, 2012), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1905224.
163 Øyvind Norli, Charlotte Ostergaard & Ibolya Schindele, Liquidity and Shareholder
Activism 25–26 (Apr. 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1344407.
164 See id.
165 See Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 4, at 246 (“The higher yields required on R
higher-spread stocks give firms an incentive to increase the liquidity of their securities, thus
reducing their opportunity cost of capital.  Consequently, liquidity-increasing financial pol-
icies may increase the value of the firm.”).
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the question for the firm becomes whether the benefits to the firm of a
longer-term shareholder base justify the cost in increased cost of capi-
tal?  That is a difficult calculation that requires, inter alia, an estimate
of the magnitude of the liquidity effect on shareholder identity.  Buf-
fett, at least, seems to think that such a strategy is cost justified.
But how does a firm implement such a strategy?  What are liquid-
ity-suppressing financial policies?  What steps can a firm take to main-
tain a large bid–ask spread?  Going public, standardization of
contractual forms of securities, limited liability, exchange listing, and
information disclosures can all operate to some degree as investments
in increased liquidity.166  Avoiding such steps, then, can be viewed as a
strategy for decreasing liquidity.
As the 1983 shareholder letter suggests, Buffett believes that not
splitting the stock will reduce liquidity (by a tolerable amount).167  As
the stock price gets higher and higher, volume is reduced with a pre-
dictable increase in the bid–ask spread.  This strategy is interestingly
and importantly counterintuitive.
Buffett’s strategy bucks the conventional wisdom that once a
stock price gets above the “normal range,” a corporation should split
its stock.  An example of this conventional wisdom appears in the let-
ter announcing Marriott’s 2006 two-for-one split:
It is my pleasure to inform you that on April 28, 2006, the Board of
Directors of Marriott International, Inc. (“Marriott”) approved a
two-for-one split of the company’s Class A common stock in the
form of a stock dividend.  The stock split was declared in recogni-
tion of our strong confidence in our company’s strength, competitive
position, and growth prospects.  We also believe that the split will
make a share of Marriott common stock more affordable to a broader
range of potential investors and increase liquidity in the trading of Marri-
ott shares.168
According to surveys, “managers justify splits on the basis that they
improve liquidity and marketability.”169  Stock splits are common
(over one hundred per year), typically occuring after very strong firm
performance, and are accompanied by small excess-positive abnormal
returns.170
166 Id.
167 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, supra note 1. R
168 Letter from Terri L. Turner, Corporate Sec’y, Marriott Int’l, Inc., to Shareholders
(June 9, 2006) (emphasis added), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/
MAR/1483037545x0x153628/73f014ac-cad1-4cb8-b65e-dfa44b5f0df6/lettertosharehold-
ers.pdf.
169 Çelim Y1ld1zhan, Stock Splits, a Survey 22 (Mar. 17, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1362259.
170 See id. at 3, 22.
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But the conventional wisdom is puzzling.  How can it be that slic-
ing the pizza into twice as many slices increases the size of the pie?
Various theories have emerged to try to explain both the prevalence
of stock splits and the fact that they seem to correlate with increased
firm value.171  The most convincing group of theories views the stock
split as a credible signal of strong future prospects.172
Another variety of explanations focuses on the observation that
firms strive to keep their shares within some “optimal” trading range.
For example, between 1943 and 1994, the average share price on the
NYSE remained at $30, despite a 1500% increase in the S&P 500 and a
500% increase in the consumer price index.173
The studies evaluating the “liquidity” explanation are particularly
interesting.  It is hard to find any increase in trading volume and, to
the extent that liquidity is measured by the bid–ask spread as a per-
centage of the share price, the bid–ask spread does not seem to be
reduced.174  So it may be that stock splits do not genuinely increase
liquidity, which makes the conventional wisdom even more puzzling.
Moreover, stock splits seem to correlate with an increase in
volatility.175
On balance, then, it is difficult to make a strong case that stock
splits increase firm value.  Instead, the best explanation seems to be a
combination of signaling and agency costs: managers of companies
that are performing strongly and with private information about
strong future performance split their shares.176  Intermediaries (bro-
kers and market makers) who benefit from a per-share based commis-
sion have an incentive to promote the stock heavily.  With more
promotion, more investors buy the stock, expanding the shareholder
base.177
This, of course, is not a very strong justification for stock splits,
especially given the Amihud and Mendelson findings that lower
bid–ask spreads attract short-term investors.  To the extent that firms
are genuinely interested in attracting long-term investors and avoiding
171 See Carroll Howard Griffin, Abnormal Returns and Stock Splits: The Decimalized vs. Frac-
tional System of Stock Price Quotes, 5 INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. 3, 3–4 (2010) (summarizing vari-
ous theories of increased firm value due to stock splits).
172 See, e.g., Y1ld1zhan, supra note 169, at 22–24. R
173 James J. Angel, Tick Size, Share Prices, and Stock Splits, 52 J. FIN. 655, 655 (1997).
174 See Y1ld1zhan, supra note 169, at 33–34. R
175 See id. at 2–3.
176 See id. at 40–41.
177 See id. The link between stock splits and liquidity is complicated by the “round lot”
tradition of brokerage fees.  In Japan, where firms can choose their stock-trading unit,
Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno show that the reduction in the minimum trading unit in-
creases the number of individual investors, liquidity, and stock price.  Yakov Amihud, Haim
Mendelson & Jun Uno, Number of Shareholders and Stock Prices: Evidence from Japan, 54 J. FIN.
1169, 1169–71 (1999).
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short-term pressure, resisting the urge to split the stock after a period
of strong performance may be the best strategy for avoiding trigger-
happy shareholders.
Berkshire Hathaway’s disclosure policy is also likely to increase
the bid–ask spread.  As noted earlier, Berkshire Hathaway, unlike
most public companies, refuses to provide quarterly or annual gui-
dance on revenue, earnings, or other financial information; it does
not hold conference calls, analyst meetings, or investor conferences.
Instead, it complies with the requirements of federal securities law
and, beyond that, limits its communications to shareholders mainly to
the annual report and annual meeting.  This approach, nearly the op-
posite of conventional practice and against IR best practices, seems
intentionally designed to deny analysts timely access to the informa-
tion they most want.  This restriction on the flow of information likely
increases the bid–ask spread.178
Another Buffett tactic for limiting liquidity may have been his in-
difference or aversion to the inclusion of Berkshire Hathaway in the
S&P 500 index.  Until its inclusion in January 2010 as a result of the
stock-for-stock acquisition of Burlington Northern and the related
stock split of Berkshire B shares, Berkshire was by far the largest firm
not included in the index.179  Inclusion in the index results in a great
deal of trading by index funds and hedgers of index funds and index
options that is not based on firm- or stock-specific information and
thereby dramatically increases its liquidity.180  Within the Amihud and
Mendelson framework, inclusion in the index will predictably shift the
shareholder base toward short-term holders.
Is Berkshire Hathaway sui generis, or might other publicly held
firms be wise to make a similar choice?  There are certainly unique
aspects to Berkshire Hathaway: Buffett holds a controlling position, he
seems largely indifferent to the share price, he has a long track record
of success, and the company holds a large amount of cash.181  Berk-
shire Hathaway does not need to raise equity capital from the finan-
cial markets and can ignore market sentiment for long periods of
time.
But, given managers’ perennial complaints about “short-term”
shareholders and speculators, the Berkshire Hathaway strategy, under-
stood within the Amihud and Mendelson framework, provides a
178 There is both theoretical and empirical support for a link between the level of
disclosure and the bid–ask spread. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia,
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital, 46 J. FIN. 1325, 1327–28 (1991); Christian Leuz &
Robert E. Verrecchia, The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure, 38 J. ACCT. RES.  91,
94 (2000).
179 See Patterson, supra note 154. R
180 See Amihud et al., supra note 158, at 319. R
181 See White, supra note 24. R
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strong argument for management to reconsider whether increasing
liquidity is worthwhile.  Anecdotally, at least, it seems that becoming
the darling of short-term investors can lead to wildly gyrating stock
prices that can damage firms.182
F. De-recruitment: Avoiding and Eliminating “Undesirables”
The counterpart of recruiting good shareholders is avoiding bad
shareholders.  A private company can blackball bad players: it can
deny them admission by refusing to allow them to invest; if they are
already shareholders, there are a variety of ways to throw them out.
What about in a public company?
1. Getting Rid of Disruptive Shareholders
The best-known example of de-recruitment in public companies
is targeted share repurchases.183  When used in the control context, it
is also known as “greenmail.”184  In the classic situation, the board ap-
proves the repurchase of shares of a disruptive investor at market
price or a premium above market because, the board claims, the in-
vestor poses a threat to the company.185  Although Delaware law was
quite permissive, greenmail in the control context has largely or en-
tirely disappeared.  First, it was not particularly effective: although the
bothersome shareholder could be eliminated, paying him off at-
tracted other equally bothersome investors.  Second, the poison pill
was both more effective and cheaper and became the preferred defen-
sive tactic.186  Third, greenmail became sufficiently distasteful that it
attracted punitive tax treatment and made directors reluctant to
succumb.
An extreme version of de-recruitment is a “going private” transac-
tion in which all of the public shareholders are bought out.  A stan-
dard justification of such transactions is that the pressures for
quarterly results from public shareholders interfere with maximizing
the value of the firm, and thus the firm is better off privately held.
182 See, e.g., Jenny Strasburg & Susan Pulliam, Pack Mentality Grips Hedge Funds, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704361504575552
462233274960.html (discussing the recent volatility of hedge funds).
183 See Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Green-
mail, 95 YALE L.J. 13, 13–14 (1985).
184 See id.
185 See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 551–53 (Del. 1964); Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136,
138–40 (Del. Ch. 1960).
186 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 81, at 875. R
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2. Keeping Bad Investors Out of a Company
Recall Buffett’s warning: “Mrs. Astor could select her 400, but an-
yone can buy any stock.”187  Is there really no way to keep a bad share-
holder out of a company?  There are two aspects to this question.
First, can it be done as a practical matter?  Second, is it legal?
There are a number of circumstances in which a corporation ex-
cludes particular sorts of potential shareholders.  For example, under
the Aviation Act, only a “citizen of the United States” may carry pas-
sengers on domestic routes, where a “citizen of the United States” is
defined as:
(A) an individual who is a citizen of the United States;
(B) a partnership each of whose partners is an individual who
is a citizen of the United States; or
(C) a corporation or association organized under the laws of
the United States or a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory
or possession of the United States, of which the president and at
least two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing of-
ficers are citizens of the United States, which is under the actual
control of citizens of the United States, and in which at least 75
percent of the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons that
are citizens of the United States.188
Foreign investors can own no more than a total of 49% of the equity
of a U.S. airline.189  As a result, it is critical for U.S. carriers to ensure
that no more than 24.9% of their voting interest is held by foreign
citizens.  Airlines use a number of techniques to ensure that they do
not lose their U.S. citizenship under the statutory definition.  United
Airline’s certificate of incorporation limits voting rights of certain for-
eign persons.190  Continental maintained two stock registers to assure
that they did not lose their operating certificate.191  U.S. Air, which
187 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, supra note 1. R
188 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15) (2006).
189 See Acquisition of Nw. Airlines, Inc. by Wings Holdings, Inc., Order No. 91-1-41, at
7–9 (Dep’t of Transp. Jan. 23, 1991); see also 49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a)(15), 44102(a); 14
C.F.R. § 204.2(c) (2011).
190 See United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation of United
Continental Holdings, Inc. pt. V, § 2, available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File
?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NjQ2MTV8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1 (“Non-Citizen
Voting Limitation.”).  UAL shares must contain a legend describing the voting restrictions:
UAL’s restated certificate of incorporation limits the total number of shares
of equity securities held by persons who are not “citizens of the United
States,” as defined in Section 40102(a)(15) of Title 49 United States Code,
to no more than 24.9% of the aggregate votes of all equity securities out-
standing.  This restriction is applied pro rata among all holders of equity
securities who fail to qualify as “citizens of the United States,” based on the
number of votes the underlying securities are entitled to.
UAL Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 27 (Feb. 26, 2010).
191 Continental’s 2009 report to stockholders explains:
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imposes a cap on voting rights of 24.9% and an “absolute cap amount”
of 49.9%, uses a somewhat more complex approach that includes
both a voting cap and an ownership cap, with provisions to suspend
voting rights and nullify nonconforming transfers.192
Delaware General Corporation Law section 202(b) permits these
sorts of limitations:
A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of securities
of a corporation, or on the amount of a corporation’s securities that
may be owned by any person or group of persons, may be imposed
by the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws or by an agree-
ment among any number of security holders or among such holders
and the corporation.  No restrictions so imposed shall be binding
with respect to securities issued prior to the adoption of the restric-
tion unless the holders of the securities are parties to an agreement
or voted in favor of the restriction.193
Section 202(c) authorizes four types of transfer restrictions, in-
cluding a provision that “[p]rohibits or restricts the transfer of the
restricted securities to, or the ownership of restricted securities by,
designated persons or classes of persons or groups of persons, and
such designation is not manifestly unreasonable.”194
Given the foreign ownership restrictions under U.S. law, such a
provision in an airline charter would clearly not be manifestly unrea-
sonable.  Moreover, Delaware specifically permits forced redemption
of shares to the extent necessary to prevent the loss of a license or
franchise from a government agency.195
Enforcement, however, is somewhat trickier, especially given
widespread patterns of custodial ownership.  In the airline sector, this
Our certificate of incorporation provides that no shares of capital stock may
be voted by or at the direction of persons who are not U.S. citizens unless
the shares are registered on a separate stock record.  Our bylaws further
provide that no shares will be registered on the separate stock record if the
amount so registered would exceed U.S. foreign ownership restrictions.
United States law currently limits the voting power in us (and other U.S.
airlines) of persons who are not citizens of the United States to 25%.
CONT’L AIRLINES, INC., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO STOCKHOLDERS 80 (2010).
192 U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 26 (Feb. 17, 2010).
193 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(b) (2011).
194 Id. § 202(c)(5).  In addition to the specific reasonableness limitation in this sec-
tion, section 202 is understood to codify the prior common law rule, which had a “proper
purpose” limitation. See Grynberg v. Burke, 378 A.2d 139, 141 (Del. Ch. 1977) (incorporat-
ing the proper purpose standard from Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 152 A. 723, 727 (Del.
1930)); 1 EDWARD P. WELCH, ANDREW J. TUREZYN & ROBERT S. SAUNDERS, FOLK ON THE
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW GCL-VI-7 to 22 (5th ed. 2011); Jesse A. Finkelstein,
Stock Transfer Restrictions Upon Alien Ownership Under Section 202 of the Delaware General Corpo-
ration Law, 38 BUS. LAW. 573, 586–88 (1983).
195 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(b)(2).
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is largely handled by requiring transferees to certify compliance with
the alien transfer restrictions.196
Could a firm use section 202 transfer restrictions to, for example,
prohibit hedge funds from acquiring shares?  To start with, because
transfer restrictions are not binding on shares issued prior to the
adoption of the restriction, except when holders agree or vote in favor
of the restriction, any such transfer restriction would have to be in the
IPO charter.197  For the sake of the hypo, assume that situation is the
case.  Would such a restriction be “manifestly unreasonable”?198
There is some authority that such a restriction would be evaluated
under the business judgment rule and that a reasonable business pur-
pose would suffice.199  In the airline context, such a standard would
clearly be satisfied.  But would a charter provision banning sales to
hedge funds also pass muster?
In an interesting case arising under the common law, Greene v.
E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., the chancellor considered a charter provi-
sion that gave the board of directors a right of first refusal to buy any
shares “to insure the harmonious conduct of the business of the Cor-
poration and to prevent the introduction of any Common Stock-
holder for any reason deemed unsuitable.”200  In rejecting the
corporation’s demurrer, the court found that the restriction on alien-
ation was excessively broad and the reason given insufficient:
They amount to no more than this—that the corporation ought at
all times to have a body of stockholders among whom there should
never be any whom the directors find not agreeable, for it is to be
remembered that it is the directors whose judgment is final in pass-
ing on the suitability of the stockholder.201
A provision barring hedge funds could be attacked on the same
basis, although obviously a firm would counter that hedge funds are
disruptive forces with interests that are not aligned with those of the
shareholders as a whole and therefore pose a threat to legitimate cor-
porate interests.
Another model for excluding certain shareholders can be seen in
companies worried about retaining their net operating losses (NOLs).
Under section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code, a company’s ability
to shelter income from taxation by using NOLs can be lost if it under-
196 See Finkelstein, supra note 194, at 581. R
197 See id. at 578.
198 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(c)(5).
199 See Finkelstein, supra note 194, at 588 (citing Fixman v. Diversified Indus., Inc., No. R
4721, 1975 WL 1947, at *9–10 (Del. Ch. May 5, 1975)).
200 2 A.2d 249, 250 (Del. Ch. 1938).
201 Id. at 252.
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goes an “ownership change.”202  Under section 382(g)(1), a corpora-
tion undergoes an ownership change if:
[A]fter any owner shift involving a 5-percent shareholder or any eq-
uity structure shift—
(A) the percentage of the stock of the loss corporation owned
by 1 or more 5-percent shareholders has increased by more than 50
percentage points, over
(B) the lowest percentage of stock of the loss corporation (or
any predecessor corporation) owned by such shareholders at any
time during the testing period.203
Although the exact method of calculating whether an ownership
change has occurred for purposes of section 382 is quite complex, the
critical feature is that only 5% blocks count in the calculation.204  As a
result, the creation of any new 5% block holders is of significant con-
cern because it can jeopardize the valuable NOLs.  Indeed, the simple
acquisition of a 5% block could irreversibly invalidate billions of dol-
lars’ worth of NOLs.
This risk is handled in different ways.  United, which as of April
2010 had more than $9 billion in NOLs, has a provision in its certifi-
cate of incorporation prohibiting sales by or to existing 5% stockhold-
ers or sales that would create new 5% stockholders without prior
approval of the board.205  The certificate imposes restrictions on re-
cording any prohibited transfer and provides measures for unwinding
prohibited transactions.206  As discussed earlier, these restrictions are
likely valid under Delaware General Corporation Law section 202.
An alternative means of excluding shareholders who may jeop-
ardize NOL carryforwards is an NOL poison pill with a 4.99% trigger.
This is the sort of poison pill recently upheld by the Delaware Su-
preme Court in Versata Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica, Inc.207  The advan-
tage of the NOL poison pill over a charter amendment is that it can
be adopted by board action.208  It can be adopted immediately, rather
than having to wait for or schedule a shareholder meeting, and will
apply to all shares, not just subsequently issued shares.  Because NOLs
cannot be reclaimed once forfeited, it can be important to act quickly
to prevent the creation of a 5% block.
202 See I.R.C. § 382(g) (2006).
203 See id. § 382(g)(1).
204 See id.
205 See UAL Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 46 (Apr. 30, 2010)
(explaining the reasons for extending the ownership limit first adopted in 2006); UNITED
CONT’L HOLDINGS, INC., supra note 190, at pt. V, § 5 (“5% Ownership Limit.”). R
206 See UNITED CONT’L HOLDINGS, INC., supra note 190, at pt. V, § 5. R
207 5 A.3d 586, 608 (Del. 2010).
208 See, e.g., id. at 595 (discussing how a board of directors passed a resolution adopting
the poison pill without reference to amending the corporate charter).
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But could a poison pill be used to exclude specific, potentially
disruptive shareholders based on their identity instead of their size?
Would a pill deployed against hedge funds as a group, rather than
against any investor who passes the threshold, pass muster?  This is an
open question under Delaware law.
III
TOOLS FOR CRAFTING THE SHAREHOLDER BASE:
TRANSFORMING SHAREHOLDERS INTO
GOOD SHAREHOLDERS
The direct strategies take shareholder type as given, seeking to
recruit shareholders of the good type and avoid shareholders of the
bad type.  But shareholder type may not be immutable.  In this Part, I
consider strategies and structures by which a firm can transform inves-
tors into shareholders of the desirable type.  The core intuition is Win-
ston Churchill’s: “We shape our buildings, and afterwards our
buildings shape us.”209
A. Control-Shareholder Ownership Structure
Corporate law has long recognized that the presence of a control
shareholder in a firm directly affects the corporate governance chal-
lenges that are presented.210  An alternative way of understanding the
impact of a control shareholder is that it is an important factor in
determining the role of noncontrolling shareholders in the govern-
ance of the firm.  When a control shareholder is present, shareholders
necessarily are cast into a substantially more passive role than in a
corporation whose shares are dispersed.  In a controlled corporation,
the controlling shareholder typically elects all the directors, effectively
chooses executive management, sets management compensation, de-
termines the direction of the firm, sets dividend policy, decides
whether or not the firm should be sold, and carries out any other
decision it wants to.
This means that a noncontrolling shareholder’s ability to act is
sharply constrained.  Whatever an investor’s typical preference for in-
volvement, in a corporation with a control shareholder, the other
shareholders have minimal say.  Indeed, the one area in which share-
holders of the controlled firm play a significant role is in policing in-
terested-party transactions, either through decision rights or through
litigation.211
209 Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the U.K., A Sense of Crowd and Urgency
(Oct. 28, 1943), in WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, NEVER GIVE IN!: THE BEST OF WINSTON CHURC-
HILL’S SPEECHES 358, 358 (2003).
210 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 82, at 785–86. R
211 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 17, at 1037–39. R
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The potential benefit of opting to create such a shareholder base
by adopting a controlling-shareholder ownership structure is that a
good “Buffett-like” controlling shareholder can act effectively and
without interference in ways that benefit the noncontrolling share-
holders.  The downside is equally obvious: bad controlling sharehold-
ers may use their control to take non–pro rata distributions at the
expense of the noncontrolling shareholders, or the bad controlling
shareholders may be incompetent.
But there is another potential downside.  By casting shareholders
in this distinctive and subordinate role, the structure may discourage
“responsible” shareholding at the same time as it encourages noncon-
trolling shareholders to challenge actions by the controlling share-
holder as self-dealing.
Moreover, corporate law’s construction of the role of noncontrol-
ling shareholders will have a selection effect.  Shareholders whose spe-
cialty or preference is to take an active role in influencing the
direction of the firm will tend to stay away from controlled companies,
while shareholders who specialize in detecting and prosecuting self-
interested transactions will be drawn to such companies.  Hedge funds
that specialize in challenging going-private transactions provide a par-
ticularly clear example.212
B. Choice of Domicile or Stock Exchange
Choice of corporate domicile, combined with choice of ex-
change, likewise exerts a powerful influence on the sort of sharehold-
ers a firm has.  Above, we discussed the clientele effects of choice of
stock exchange.  But the choice has a broader influence.
Consider a venture choosing between incorporating in Delaware
with the ultimate aim of going public on NASDAQ, on the one hand,
and incorporating in the United Kingdom with a London listing on
the other.  How will the choice affect the shareholder base?  As has
long been noted, Delaware is a board-centered jurisdiction while the
United Kingdom is shareholder-centric.  These differences emerge in
a variety of ways:  The center of decision making under U.K. law is the
shareholders acting in the general meeting; in Delaware, the center of
decision making is the board of directors.213  With respect to direc-
tors, U.K. shareholders have the power to elect directors, and impor-
tantly they have the power to remove directors with or without cause
212 See id. at 1037–39 (discussing tactics taken by hedge funds—including litigation,
shareholder revolts, exercising appraisal rights, and negotiating the share price—to im-
prove the terms of a merger or acquisition).
213 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2011); PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCI-
PLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 423 (8th ed. 2008).
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before the expiration of the director’s term.214  This power is impor-
tant because shareholders also have the power to call a general meet-
ing without board acquiescence or a special provision in the articles of
incorporation.215  These provisions prevent the entrenchment pro-
vided by staggered boards.216  By contrast, Delaware shareholders
have no power to call a meeting, and when there is a staggered board,
directors can only be removed for cause.217  In the United Kingdom,
shareholders may force the company, at company’s expense, to circu-
late resolutions to be voted on at the annual general meeting, which,
if adopted, are binding.218  Shareholders of a Delaware corporation
may only enact bylaws, and the scope of permissible bylaws is sharply
limited.219  The shareholder-centric character of U.K. corporation law
is particularly striking in the control context.  Under the City Code,
directors must remain largely passive when a tender offer is made for
the shares of the company and cannot take any “frustrating action”
without shareholder approval.220  U.S. shareholder activists dream
about such a provision.221
The exchange rules parallel these doctrinal differences: the
board of a Delaware corporation listed on the NASDAQ or NYSE can
adopt, for example, a poison pill or agree to breakup fees with a fa-
vored bidder, while a U.K. company listed on the London Stock Ex-
change is subject to the City Code and its no-frustration, no-assistance
rules.222  These differences may affect how shareholders act, even if
shareholders’ preferences, skills, or investment in activism stay con-
stant.  Thus, institutional investors like Fidelity or TIAA-CREF might
214 See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 168(1) (Eng.).
215 See id. §§ 303–05.
216 See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and
Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1737
(2007).
217 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k).
218 See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 338–40.
219 See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008)
(noting that shareholders lack management power and have limited ability to adopt
bylaws).
220 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS & MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS,
Rule 21 (10th ed. 2011), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2008/11/code.pdf; see also id. at Gen. Principle 3 (stating that the board “must
not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid”). See
generally Armour & Skeel, supra note 216, at 1729 (explaining that the United Kingdom’s R
self-regulation system protects investors by preventing management from engaging in de-
fensive efforts to block a takeover).
221 See Bebchuk, supra note 16, at 896 (“[S]hareholders [should have] the power to R
adopt binding resolutions instructing management not to block a particular tender
offer.”).
222 See Armour & Skeel, supra note 216, at 1735–77.  For an overview of U.K. takeover R
regulation, see generally id.
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do more as shareholders in U.K.-incorporated or LSE-listed firms sim-
ply because they can do more things.223
Relatedly, investors may choose to invest more in activism be-
cause there is a greater payoff to activism.  A U.S. investor who is
largely passive in the U.S. could hire experts in shareholder activism
to work on their U.K. portfolio because there is greater scope for activ-
ism in the United Kingdom.
Finally, there may be a selection effect.  Investors may choose to
invest because a situation affords them the ability to be more active.
When a body of corporate law provides a minority veto in a freezeout,
that veto right may provide an attractive investment opportunity.224
Thus, although there is evidence that hedge funds pay attention
to corporate law rules when choosing investments, there is little evi-
dence that institutional investors like Fidelity are more active in the
United Kingdom or invest more in activism because of these
differences.225
C. New Investor Relations:  Strategic Engagement with Key
Shareholders
It is now accepted that the shareholder base has been trans-
formed: ownership is more concentrated than ever; shareholders vote
on ever more matters; shareholder activism is a fixture of the corpo-
rate governance landscape, with proxy contests, short-slate proxy con-
tests, and “just vote no” campaigns relatively common; Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS) has emerged to play a critical role, either
as a catalyst, a conduit, or an initiator, depending on one’s perspec-
tive; and shareholder passivity seems to be a vestige of the past.
While some bemoan these changes, others recognize the oppor-
tunities that arise out of these developments in the corporate govern-
ance landscape.  A few pioneers with deep contacts among
institutional investors have begun to play an intermediary role be-
tween issuers and their shareholders.  In contrast to traditional IR ef-
forts (the continuous communication function described above)—
this “New Investor Relations” function tends to be more episodic, led
by high-level outside actors, and involves the highest levels of the com-
pany.  This version of “managing the shareholder relationship” takes
seriously the current importance of empowered shareholders and
223 Fidelity U.S. and Fidelity U.K. have some overlapping ownership (the Johnson fam-
ily owns just under half of each) but are independent firms.  For a long time, Fidelity U.S.
delegated the selection and management of U.K. investments to Fidelity U.K. See Tele-
phone Interview with Eric Roiter, former Gen. Counsel, Fidelity (Sept. 14, 2011).
224 See Marina Strauss, Desjardins Heads to the Sears Checkout; Outspoken Sears Canada Mi-
nority Investor Quietly Sells Its Stake After Hedge Fund’s Bid to Take It Private Fails, GLOBE & MAIL
(Canada), Apr. 25, 2007, at B5.
225 See Telephone Interview with Eric Roiter, supra note 223. R
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seeks to shape that relationship.226  It can thus be understood as a
potentially important part of the second type of shareholder eugenics;
namely, the shaping of shareholders of a bad or unknown type into
shareholders of a good type.
Examining a couple of the pioneers of the New Investor Relations
will help bring the role into better focus.  Wilcox is now the chair of
Sodali, a European-based consulting firm whose “mission is to help
companies anticipate, understand and deal effectively with the expec-
tations of investors, minority shareholders and the financial markets.
To this purpose, it provides strategic advice, governance education,
research, communications and transactional services designed to opti-
mize Companies’ responsiveness towards their debt and equity
holders.”227
Wilcox comes to this role with a long, deep relationship with the
shareholder community.  For many years, he was a senior figure (and
chairman) at Georgeson & Company, a leading proxy solicitation
firm.  He subsequently moved to TIAA-CREF, a leading institutional
investor, where he was Senior Vice President and Head of Corporate
Governance.228  He thus brings contacts from the institutional inves-
tor world to his new role of helping firms improve their relationships
with their shareholders.
In arguing that IR and corporate governance are converging, Wil-
cox explains that:
Shareholders now want to know how board decisions serve their
long-term interests.  The board’s willingness and ability to explain
its decisions, disclose its procedures and clearly articulate its policies
and goals are particularly important with respect to the following
issues: remuneration, “tone at the top,” CEO leadership, ethics, en-
trepreneurial spirit, internal equity and employee morale, integrity,
business standards, social policy and community relations.  If the
board’s explanation of its policies and decisions is clear and con-
vincing, shareholder support will not waver.
The barriers to the convergence of IR and CG are primarily behav-
ioral and practical, not legal.  The reasons include: unwillingness to
change old ways and habits, defensiveness, outdated assumptions,
ego, bad advice, peer pressure, inertia, privilege, vested interests,
fear.229
226 See generally Bushee & Miller, supra note 96 (discussing how firms’ use of IR strate- R
gies can lead to a larger, more knowledgeable shareholder base and an improvement in
the firms’ market valuation).
227 SODALI, http://www.sodali.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
228 John Wilcox, SODALI, http://www.sodali.com/aboutus/boardmember/johnwilcox.
htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
229 John Wilcox, Presentation Outline: Is There a Convergence of Investor Relations
and Corporate Governance?, SODALI (Jan 19., 2010), http://www.nevir.nl/att_documents/
Sodali%20-%20IRGR%20-%20Amsterdam%20-%202010.03.23.pdf; see also Richard H.
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Christopher Young provides another glimpse over the horizon.
In 2004, Young joined ISS as Director of M&A and Proxy Fight Re-
search.230  In that capacity, his role was to build ISS’s analytic capacity
in evaluating contested transactions and proxy fights to provide better
voting advice to ISS’s investor clients.231  He came to this role with a
background in investment banking and M&A law.  While at ISS, he
played a role in nearly every high profile deal or proxy fight and devel-
oped contacts with a wide range of leading institutional investors.232
In the spring of 2010, Young left ISS for Credit Suisse to become
head of the Takeover Defense practice within the M&A group.233  To
his new role, Young brings a Rolodex full of shareholder contacts and
a strong sense of their concerns.  This knowledge puts Young in a po-
sition to alert companies to emerging shareholder dissatisfaction and
allows him to work with companies to better explain themselves to
their key shareholders.  The idea seems to be that investors, who know
and trust Young from his days at ISS, will still be willing to return his
phone calls.
This is an “investor relations” function, but with a twist.  It focuses
on contentious or potentially contentious situations; becomes crucial
when there is a proxy fight over a transaction or a board election; is
directed at the highest levels of the company and investor community;
and, when it works, is a spring board for an investment-banking rela-
tionship with the company.  What is so interesting about the role is
that it takes shareholder empowerment as a given and asks how firms
can improve relationships with their shareholders so that the share-
holders will be supportive rather than resistant.
Wilcox and Young are both betting on a new corporate govern-
ance landscape in which influential shareholders are a salient feature.
With that starting point, they are carving out roles facilitating produc-
tive engagement between firms and their shareholders—engagement
that goes beyond “check the box” corporate governance and can
shape the shareholders’ involvement in the firm.  That engagement is
in the interests of both firms and shareholders and will sometimes be
decisive.
Koppes, Structural Strength: A Team Approach Provides the Best Support for the Triangle of Corpo-
rate Governance, 6 INVESTOR REL. Q., no. 3, 2004 at 4, 4 (suggesting that the IR officer
should participate in corporate governance).
230 See Press Release, Credit Suisse, Chris Young to Join Credit Suisse as Head of Take-
over Defense in its Investment Bank (Apr. 14, 2010), available at https://www.credit-suisse.
com/news/en/media_release.jsp?ns=41456.
231 David Marcus, Ready for Battle, DEAL MAG. (June 4, 2010, 11:57 AM), http://www.
thedeal.com/magazine/ID/034597/dealmakers/weekly-movers-and-shakers/ready-for-
battle.php.
232 See id.
233 See id.
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In the New Investor Relations, the legal framework of traditional
IR discussed above—Regulation FD, the 2003 Global Research Settle-
ment, and federal securities law—is beside the point.  Instead, two
rather different features of the legal landscape are more prominent.
The first feature, ERISA, provides some of the motivating force be-
hind shareholder activism and the prominent role of ISS.  Over the
last decade, the recognition that ERISA requires that covered fiducia-
ries treat corporate votes as an asset, and therefore manage them pru-
dently, has pushed institutional investors to fulfill those duties by
relying on, or at least subscribing to, outside recommendations from
proxy advisory firms.  The idea has been that it is reasonable for an
ERISA fiduciary to rely on an expert proxy advisory consultant.  From
this perspective, the fees paid to ISS and Glass Lewis can be thought of
as rather minor “ERISA insurance” premiums.234
The second feature of significance is the entrenched liability-fo-
cused culture of the U.S. boardroom.  The overall shape of U.S. secur-
ities law—with multiple rules, detailed requirements, and robust
public and private enforcement—has engendered a compliance-fo-
cused mentality.  This mentality, as Wilcox has argued,235 stands in the
way of productive, informative communication between public com-
panies’ boards and their shareholders.  It is difficult to imagine man-
agers and directors of a U.S. public company sitting down with major
shareholders to discuss their strategic vision openly and directly in a
setting unscripted by lawyers.  Such a dialogue, common in the private
equity or venture capital world of privately held corporations, can
clearly be of great value to both firms and investors, but is nearly
unimaginable in the current environment.
D. Alternative Capital Structures as Shaping Strategies
A variety of other strategies may significantly shape the share-
holder base within the U.S. system.  In this regard, consider two op-
tions that firms may use in shaping their capital structure: dual-class
shares and tenured voting.
234 See Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1442–43 (2002) (stating that the Department of Labor “has recog-
nized that proxy votes have economic value and that pension managers have fiduciary
responsibilities in voting portfolio shares”).
235 See Wilcox, supra note 109, at 3–4 (arguing that “textbook compliance with govern- R
ance rules [does] not guarantee good governance in practice” and suggesting that boards
of directors increase and improve communication with shareholders).
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1. Dual-Class Shares
Dual-class shares—a capital structure in which one class of shares
is low- or nonvoting while the other class of shares is high-voting236—
will shape the shareholder base both by shaping the shareholder’s
role and through the resulting selection effects.  When a single share-
holder or group holds the high-voting shares, the effect on the inves-
tors holding low- or nonvoting shares will be identical to the
controlling shareholder structure described above.  As with control-
ling shareholder structures, a dual-class capital structure largely elimi-
nates low-voting shareholders’ ability to influence the course of the
company through the normal ways, such as electing directors or vot-
ing on significant decisions or transactions.  As such, dual-class shares
tend to turn shareholders into passive shareholders, except insofar as
low-voting shareholders play a special role in regulating related-party
transactions (which may make some shareholders hyperlitigious).
In principle, although rarely in practice, a company may have a
dual-class capital structure but no controlling shareholder or
group.237  In this context, the shaping function of the structure and its
selection effects would be quite obvious: shareholders who wished to
be active could opt into the high-voting shares; those who wished to
be passive could opt into low-voting shares.  The fact that such a struc-
ture is either rare or nonexistent is good evidence that the use of dual-
class capital structures is tightly linked to maintaining control with less
than a majority of the equity in the firm.  As such, in terms of the
effect on the shareholder base, dual-class structure can be analyzed in
the same way as control shareholder structures.
The evidence of the agency costs created by dual-class structures
is quite robust.238  This raises the principal downside of dual-class
structures: they allow a controlling shareholder to maintain control
without continuing to own a majority of the equity in the company.
This, in turn, exacerbates the divergence of control rights and cash
236 See 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:21 (rev. 3d ed. 2011).
237 See, e.g., FAQs, TRONOX INC., http://www.tronox.com/reorganization/rorg_
emerge/rorg_emerge_faq.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012) (explaining the company’s cur-
rent capitalization, which converts prebankruptcy shares of common stock into two differ-
ent series of warrants); Tronox Emerges From Chapter 11: Exits Bankruptcy as a Much Stronger
Company with a Right-Sized Capital Structure, TRONOX INC., http://www.tronox.com/reorgan-
ization/rorg_emerge/news_Tronox_Emerges_Chpt_11.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012)
(stating that the company has emerged from bankruptcy with a “new capital structure”).
238 See generally Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An
Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1053–81 (2010)
(analyzing the impact of ownership rights on firm value and finding that maintaining in-
sider control reduces the value of the firm); Ron W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency
Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697, 1697–1722 (2009) (finding that firm value
declines as insiders gain more control rights because of the agency problem).
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flow rights, creating incentives to take private benefits of control.  Yet,
at the same time, some of the most successful companies in the
United States have dual-class structures, including Berkshire
Hathaway, Comcast, Ford, Google, Liberty Media, News Corp., Turner
Broadcasting, and Viacom.239  Evidently, in large companies with sub-
stantial need for equity capital, dual-class structures are a useful and
perhaps essential way to maintain a controlling-shareholder structure.
The success of these companies suggests that the benefits of control-
ling-shareholder structures may sometimes outweigh the costs that ac-
company dual-class capitalization.
2. Tenured Voting
Tenure Voting (TV), also known as time-phased voting, is a strat-
egy for giving long-term shareholders more votes than short-term
shareholders.240  It can be implemented in a variety of ways.  At Pot-
latch Corp., a forest products company that adopted TV as an an-
titakeover measure in 1985, shareholders who held for four years or
longer received four votes per share, while shareholders who held for
a shorter period could cast one vote per share.  Upon adoption in
1985, Potlatch presumed that each shareholder had held for more
than four years and received four votes per share.  As shares were sold,
they dropped down to one vote per share.241
As a technical matter, implementation was straightforward: re-
cord shareholders were presumed to have held the shares for the pe-
riod shown in the share registry; nominees were presumed to have
held shares for less than four years, unless otherwise certified on the
voting instruction form (subject to verification by Potlatch).  Potlatch
provided exceptions, inter alia, for shares acquired pursuant to certain
employee benefit plans and shares acquired by gift, inheritance, or
under the terms of a trust.242
239 See Paul Schultz & Sophie Shive, Mispricing of Dual-Class Shares: Profit Opportuni-
ties, Arbitrage, and Trading 57–60 (Oct. 29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338885 (listing dual-class firms through 2006); see also, e.g.,
News Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 114 (Aug. 6, 2010) (stating that the company
has two classes of common stock); Elinor Mills, Google Sticks with Dual-Class Structure, CNET
NEWS (May 11, 2006, 5:45 PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1030_3-6071494.html.
240 See 1 ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE: MERGERS
& ACQUISITIONS § 6.04 n.77 (7th ed. 2011).
241 See Potlatch Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 31 (Mar. 30,
2005) [hereinafter Potlatch Corp. Proxy Statement 2005]; Potlatch Corp., Definitive Proxy
Statement (Form DEF 14A), at A-1 (Apr. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Potlatch Corp. Proxy State-
ment 2004].
242 See Potlatch Corp. Proxy Statement 2005, supra note 241, at A-1. R
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Alternative models are available.  The line between short-term
and long-term can be adjusted.243  Shares can gain increased votes
more gradually (e.g., by one vote per year to a maximum of four
votes).  The ratio in voting power between short-term and long-term
shares can vary.244  It can be entirely prospective so that all sharehold-
ers start out with short-term shares and only those who hold end up
with long-term shares.  Each implementation can have a different ef-
fect on the shifting of influence among the shareholding population.
In all of its versions, however, the effect of TV is to give long-term
shareholders (however defined) a bigger say.  As such, it is a particu-
larly interesting shaping strategy.  Consider the following shareholder
profile, which provides a rough example of a widely held company:
x < 1 year: 25%
1 year < x < 2 years: 25%
2 years < x < 4 years: 25%
4 years < x: 25%,
where x is the holding period.  Assuming the company has 100 shares
outstanding, without TV there would be twenty-five votes in each cate-
gory.  Under TV with a four-year trigger, by contrast, the voting rights
would be distributed as follows:
x < 1 year: 25 votes
1 year < x < 2 years: 25 votes
2 years < x < 4 years: 25 votes
4 years < x: 100 votes.
In other words, under TV, shareholders who held for less than a year
would have to convince at least a portion of the 4+ year shareholders
to vote with them to carry the day.  If a single shareholder is the 4+
year holder (e.g., a founder), TV will give that shareholder voting
control.
Unlike mechanisms that shift the focus of decision making from
shareholders to the board of directors, like the poison pill, TV shifts
decision-making power within the shareholder group.  In shifting de-
cision-making power to long-term shareholders, it provides greater in-
centives to longer-term shareholders to invest in making those
decisions and greater incentive to remain shareholders to enjoy the
increased voting rights.  If length of ownership is a reasonable proxy
for being a good shareholder (a highly contestable proposition on
which I take no position), then TV shifts power from bad shareholders
243 For example, at Milacron, the holding period was three years.  Williams v. Geier,
671 A.2d 1368, 1372 (Del. 1996).
244 At Milacron, the ratio was 1:10. Id. (shareholders received one vote per share until
they had held their shares for three years, at which point they received ten votes per
share).  At Potlatch, it was 1:4. See Potlatch Corp. Proxy Statement 2005, supra note 241 R
(long-term shares received four votes while short-term shares received only one).
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(and, in doing so, rendering them more passive) to good sharehold-
ers or to shareholders who, by virtue of their greater power, will be-
come good.  TV can thus shift the character of the shareholder base.
The downsides are the inverse of the upsides.  TV may cement
control in a group of insiders with a smaller equity stake thereby creat-
ing or aggravating a divergence of decision-making power and share
of cash flows.  Long-term shareholders may be less responsible than
short-term shareholders if long-term shareholders are typically index
funds who, in competing on price, resist portfolio firm-specific invest-
ments, while short–term shareholders include hedge funds with fo-
cused financial incentives because of lack of diversification.
3. Regulatory Treatment
As a matter of substantive corporate law, Delaware has long per-
mitted both dual-class and TV capital structures, so long as they were
clearly spelled out in the charter.245  At present, it is also permissible
under federal securities regulation.  The most significant legal barrier
arises from stock exchange listing requirements: all the major ex-
changes prohibit midstream adoption of either.246
Federal securities law takes no official position regarding depar-
tures from one-share, one-vote.  In general, voting rights are consid-
ered a part of state corporate law defining the fundamental rights that
shareholders have.247  In the late 1980s, in response to a wave of dual-
class restructurings perceived as abusive, the SEC departed from this
general view and adopted rule 19c-4, which mandated that stock ex-
changes adopt a rule prohibiting the listing of shares of any company
that “issues any class of security, or takes other corporate action, with
the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing the per
share voting rights of holders of an outstanding class or classes of com-
mon stock of such issuer registered pursuant to section 12 of the
Act.”248  The text of the rule and discussion made clear that this pro-
hibited any “corporate action to impose any restriction on the voting
power of shares of the common stock of the issuer held by a beneficial
or record holder based on the length of time such shares have been
held by such beneficial or record holder,” namely, TV.249  The stock
245 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (2011).  In Williams v. Geier, the Delaware Supreme
Court explicitly recognized the validity of Milacron’s charter amendment to adopt a “ten-
ure voting” system in which shares held for three years received ten votes per share.  671
A.2d at 1372.
246 See Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to the
First State as First in Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 779, 794–97 (2004) (detailing the
SEC’s and the exchanges’ relationships to dual-class voting).
247 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
248 Voting Rights Listing Standards, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,376–01 (July 12, 1988).
249 Id.
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exchanges complied.  Subsequently, although the SEC rule was held
invalid,250 the stock exchanges proposed, and the SEC approved,
nearly identical rules.251
The NYSE listing requirements provide that:
Voting rights of existing shareholders of publicly traded common
stock registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act cannot be
disparately reduced or restricted through any corporate action or
issuance.  Examples of such corporate action or issuance include,
but are not limited to, the adoption of time phased voting plans, the
adoption of capped voting rights plans, the issuance of super voting
stock, or the issuance of stock with voting rights less than the per
share voting rights of the existing common stock through an ex-
change offer.252
The current state of play, then, is that firms may go public with dual-
class and TV capital structures but may not amend their charters to
adopt it midstream.
The basis of the prohibition of midstream changes was a concern
that disorganized shareholders, in a version of the familiar prisoner’s
dilemma, could be manipulated to vote in favor of a midstream
change that is not in their interests.  For example, by tying a sweetener
to the value-reducing change, disorganized shareholders could ration-
ally vote for a change that reduces the value of their shares.253
In an age of empowered shareholders, in which firms should
think about selecting and shaping an optimal shareholder base,
prohibiting a key design tool is inappropriate.  With everything else
we let shareholders vote on—exculpating directors under Delaware
General Corporation Law section 102(b)(7), say on pay, 14a-8 propos-
als, director elections, mergers—not trusting them to vote intelli-
gently on midstream changes to capital structure is unnecessary.  This
250 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
251 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Changes by New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
et al., Relating to the Exchanges’ and Association’s Rules Regarding Shareholder Voting
Rights, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,614–01 (Aug. 18, 1994).
252 NYSE Rule 313.00 Voting Rights, NYSE, http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/
PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F4&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm
%2Dsections%2F (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).  The NASDAQ and Amex rules are to the
same effect. NASDAQ Rule 5640. Voting Rights, NASDAQ (Mar.12, 2009), http://nasdaq.
cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F1%5F
4%5F2&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequityrules%2F; NYSE Amex Rule
Sec. 122. Common Voting Rights, NYSE AMEX, http://wallstreet.cch.com/AMEXtools/Plat
formViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_1_1&manual=/AMEX/CompanyGuide/amex-com-
pany-guide (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
253 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (1988); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating
Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 832–34 (1987)
(illustrating how public shareholders will participate in dual-class transactions due to in-
centives, even though the transaction is not in their collective best interests).
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is not to say that shareholders or firms will choose these structures:
Potlatch eliminated its time-phased voting system in 2005 in response
to institutional shareholder pressure, organized by ISS.254  But firms
and shareholders should at least have the option to experiment with
different ways of shaping the shareholder base.
CONCLUSION
Shareholders occupy one vertex of the corporate governance tri-
angle.  As the metaphor suggests, and as I have argued above, the
identity of the shareholders and their fit with the board of directors
and the managers (the other two vertices) are potentially important to
firm value.  What, then, are the implications of this analysis for legal
policy and firms?  Are there practical takeaways?  I think there are
several.
First, rather than passively accepting whatever shareholder base
emerges and then complaining about it, public companies should
think about who they want as shareholders and why.  As I show above,
companies can do quite a lot to select and shape a productive share-
holder base.
Second, once companies decide what sort of shareholders they
want, they should think systematically about how to create the desired
shareholder base.  Given the potential effect of shareholder base on
firm value, crafting the optimal shareholder base is a strategic deci-
sion for the firm.  Choice of corporate domicile, stock exchange, pub-
lic image, disclosure policy, stock price and liquidity, and many other
factors affect what sorts of shareholders are attracted to a given com-
pany.  For example, before splitting shares, a board should think
about how it will affect the composition of the shareholder base, and,
in particular, whether the benefits of increased liquidity will offset any
harms from a shift to shorter-term shareholders.
Third, the IR function, in its various forms, is a key part of shap-
ing a shareholder base.  Building relationships around fundamental
issues of corporate strategy and policy rather than quarterly earnings
reports holds the potential for changing an adversarial relationship
into a more cooperative and productive one.  There are a variety of
proposals for how this might be done.  A “Directors’ Discussion and
Analysis” section of the proxy statement or annual report would be a
starting point.  Regular meetings between the board and major inves-
tors on topics such as corporate strategy, risk control, compensation,
ethics, CEO succession, and ESG (environmental, social, and corpo-
254 See Potlatch Corp. Proxy Statement 2005, supra note 241, at 31; INSTITUTIONAL R
S’HOLDER SERVS., PROXY ANALYSIS, POTLATCH CORP. 10 (May 3, 2004); INSTITUTIONAL
S’HOLDER SERVS., PROXY ANALYSIS, POTLATCH CORP. 10 (May 2, 2005).
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rate governance) could be a useful way to create good
shareholders.255
Fourth, corporate architecture can be a powerful force.  If a
firm’s structures empower (or pacify) shareholders in particular ways,
it will attract particular sorts of shareholders and shape the ones it
attracts.  A legal rule that casts shareholders as the monitor of con-
flicted transactions will produce shareholders willing to sue over con-
flicted transactions.  We should remove regulatory barriers that block
architectural experimentation such as the prohibition on midstream
adoption of departures from one-share, one-vote.
Fifth, the law needs to avoid chilling communication and trans-
forming the shareholder–board relationship into a lawyer-driven, ster-
ile interaction.  For example, creating a safe harbor from Regulation
FD for a defined set of “high level” topics would facilitate productive
communication.  The model should be the sort of relationship that
exists between private equity funds or venture capitalists and the man-
agers in a private company, with the exclusion of price-sensitive infor-
mation like earnings.
Sixth, managers, boards, investors, and regulators need to rein in
their distrust of all things new or unusual.  We need not be suspicious
of every communication between boards and shareholders.  Directors
are not necessarily going behind the CEO’s back.  Investors are not
necessarily seeking to trade on material nonpublic information.
Large investors do not necessarily disadvantage small investors when
they get privileged access to directors and managers.
Seventh, productive relationships between investors and compa-
nies are likely to be company specific and thus unlikely to be suscepti-
ble to “check-the-box,” “one-size-fits-all” solutions.  “Best practices”
may be a useful starting point, but investors and companies should be
open to alternative approaches.
Finally, intermediaries (e.g., lawyers, bankers, consultants) may
want to find ways to profit from the transformed landscape of corpo-
rate governance in which shareholders are more active and advisory
firms give advice.
Although there are good reasons to believe that the composition
of the shareholder base and the firm–shareholder relationship mat-
ter, concerns with the shareholder base have largely fallen outside of
the corporate governance debate.  This Article is an attempt to bring
these matters into the discussion.  Indeed, once one starts thinking
about how firms shape their shareholder base, it turns out that there
are numerous ways to do so.  Sometimes the law helps; sometimes it
hinders.  In this preliminary inquiry, I have sought to map the land-
255 See Wilcox, supra note 109, at 4. R
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scape and to appreciate some of its salient features.  As Buffett sug-
gests, contrary to first impressions, shareholder eugenics is not an
entirely hopeless undertaking.
